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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the FBI and other federal law enforcement
agencies have greatly expanded their presence abroad, investigating
everything from narcotics trade and Internet fraud schemes to
terrorism. Where this law enforcement activity includes custodial
interrogation of non-American citizens abroad, must American law
enforcement officials provide Miranda warnings to such suspects? In
2001 in United States v. Bin Laden, a federal district court held that
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination applies to
non-American citizens interrogated abroad, thus requiring Miranda
warnings in this context. This Article criticizes the Bin Laden court’s
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strict application of Miranda and suggests that Miranda should be
interpreted as a flexible prophylactic rule that can be modified or
discarded abroad where its application is illogical. The Article then
argues that the policies behind Miranda do not always support its
application abroad in the same way that it is systematically applied in
the domestic setting. As a result, an FBI agent abroad should be
required to advise a non-American suspect only of the rights that he
enjoys in the country where the interrogation takes place, to the extent
such rights can be reasonably determined by the agent under the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. In addition, if the FBI
agent makes a mistake in interpreting the rights available to a given
suspect under foreign law, and does not advise the suspect of a right
which he in fact had, the exclusionary rule should not be employed as
long as the agent misinterpreted the foreign law in good faith.
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INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency in recent years, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and other federal law enforcement agencies have
found it necessary to travel to foreign nations to investigate violations
of American criminal laws committed by non-American citizens.1 If
these investigations are successful, the suspects are often arrested
abroad and brought to the United States to stand trial. As Justice
Brennan observed in 1990 in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez:
Particularly in the past decade, our Government has sought,
successfully, to hold foreign nationals criminally liable under federal
laws for conduct committed entirely beyond the territorial limits of
the United States that nevertheless has effects in this country.
Foreign nationals must now take care not to violate our drug laws,
1. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International
Enforcement of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 37, 51–52 (1990) (“Violent attacks on
United States citizens have . . . drawn the FBI overseas in recent years. Not only has the number
of terrorist incidents and politically motivated killings involving Americans risen, but the United
States has asserted greater jurisdiction over such crimes.”). Since 1985, “FBI agents have lent
their forensic skills in assorted criminal investigations, including the 1985 hijacking of the
Achille Lauro, the mid-1988 airplane accident in Pakistan that killed President Zia, and the
crash of a Pan Am flight in Scotland in late 1988.” Id. at 52; see also Carrie Truehart, Comment,
United States v. Bin Laden, Is There A Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Warrant
Requirement for Searches of “United States Persons” Abroad?, 82 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (manuscript at 1–2, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (documenting expansion of
American investigations into criminal activity abroad, particularly in response to acts of
terrorism).
For purposes of this Article, the term “non-American” refers to an individual who is
not a citizen of the United States.
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our antitrust laws, our securities laws, and a host of other federal
criminal statutes. The enormous expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction outside our Nation’s boundaries has led one
commentator to suggest that our country’s three largest exports are
now “rock music, blue jeans, and United States law.”2
As new technologies make national borders less of an obstacle to
criminal enterprises engaging in everything from Internet fraud
schemes to narcotics trade, and in light of the ongoing threat of
terrorist attacks against American targets, this upward trend will
undoubtedly continue.3 This heightened activity of American law
enforcement officials abroad will compel American courts to confront
two closely related questions of constitutional significance. Does the
Fifth Amendment’s4 privilege against self-incrimination5 apply to non-
American citizens who confess to American authorities abroad and
who are later tried in the United States? And if the Fifth Amendment
does apply, does an FBI agent conducting an investigation abroad
2. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279–81 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application
of United States Law, 14 INT’L LAW. 257, 257 (1980)) (citations omitted).
3. See Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 38:
[T]oday, terrorism, arms and high tech smuggling, and securities, tax and commercial
fraud all contribute to this trend. In general, as the scope and volume of international
interactions ranging from trade to tourism increase, so too do the criminal activities
that inevitably accompany them. Numerous criminal justice concerns . . . grow out of
the extensive United States diplomatic presence abroad as well as the stationing of
300,000 troops overseas.
See also United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Our next
inquiry [the application of Miranda overseas] focuses on an issue imbued with significant
consequence, not the least of which is its inevitable impact on American law enforcement
officials who, in furtherance of their duties and with increasing regularity, are dispatched and
stationed beyond our national borders.”); RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO THE
U.S. 12 (2001) (stating that beginning in 1996 the FBI commenced a plan to double the number
of agents serving in legal attaché offices in American embassies by the year 2000).
4. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in the time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
5. Although the details of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination will
be explored later in this Article, it is based upon the following language in the text of the Fifth
Amendment: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” Id.; see infra notes 43–63 and accompanying text.
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have to provide Miranda warnings6 to a non-American citizen before
interrogating him?7
Although the answers to these two questions will impact every
category of American criminal investigations abroad from narcotics
to fraud, they have assumed greater importance in the aftermath of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and
Washington, D.C. Indeed, in mid-December 2001, a host of FBI
agents were sent to Afghanistan to interrogate captured members of
the al Qaeda network, the group that was allegedly behind the
attacks.8 And as the United States and its allies continue to fight the
“War Against Terrorism” and seek out “cells” of terrorist activity
located in countries around the globe, interrogations of non-
American citizens by American officials will undoubtedly increase
6. The intricacies of the Miranda doctrine will be developed in detail later in this Article.
See infra notes 54–63 and accompanying text. In short, “Miranda warnings” are recitations of a
suspect’s constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, which
must be administered before a law enforcement officer can “interrogate” a suspect who is in
police “custody.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (describing the warnings
required prior to “in-custody interrogation”).
7. Because Miranda warnings are required only for “custodial interrogation,” see infra
note 56 and accompanying text, this Article assumes that a custodial environment is present
whenever it explores whether or not Miranda warnings are required prior to an interrogation
that occurs abroad.
8. See A Nation Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at B2 (“Eight F.B.I. agents
arrived . . . in Kandahar to begin interrogating captured [a]l Qaeda fighters . . . .”). In addition,
the FBI in Afghanistan interviewed John Walker Lindh, an American who is facing numerous
federal charges for joining the Taliban in its defense of Afghanistan. Josh Meyer, FBI Agents
Land in Desert to Interrogate American Talib, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at A3. At the time this
Article went to press, it was not clear whether the captured al Qaeda members would be tried in
the United States civilian court system or in military tribunals. If some of the prisoners are tried
in military tribunals, it is quite possible that Miranda and other pretrial constitutional safeguards
would not apply therein. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1 (March
21, 2002) (establishing procedures for trials by military commissions of certain non-American
citizens in the War Against Terrorism, and stating that any and all probative evidence shall be
admissible in such trials). Thus far, however, the one member of al Qaeda that has been charged
with participating in the events of September 11, 2001, has been indicted in federal district court
in Virginia, and his trial before a civilian jury has been scheduled for October 2002. Terrorist
Suspect Arraigned, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2002, at C2. The United States also has indicated that
John Walker Lindh would be tried in a civilian court in the United States. See FBI Agents Land
in Desert to Interrogate American Talib, supra. Civilian courts moved to the forefront of the war
on terrorism recently, when a federal grand jury in New Jersey indicted a British national for
the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Dan Eggen, U.S.
Indicts Militant in Pearl’s Death, WASH. POST, March 15, 2002, at A1.
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both in number and importance.9 But regardless of the criminal
context, the central questions remain: are non-Americans entitled to
the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination when they
are interrogated by American officials beyond the borders of the
United States, and if so, must they be Mirandized before they are
interrogated?
Complicating these issues further is the fact that the laws of many
foreign nations do not provide criminal suspects with the panoply of
rights embodied in Miranda, such as the right to remain silent or the
right to speak to an attorney.10 For example, if an FBI agent
conducting an interrogation abroad were to inform a suspect that he
has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney—but the
law of that country did not recognize the right to remain silent and
dictated that criminal suspects were not entitled to an attorney until
trial—the FBI agent would be, in essence, misleading the suspect.
Indeed, the FBI agent in such a scenario would be hard pressed to
make good on his end of the deal if the suspect heeded the Miranda
warnings by demanding an attorney. If, on the other hand, the FBI
agent chose to forego the standard Miranda warnings, any confession
he thereafter obtained from that suspect—regardless of whether the
confession was voluntary or not—would be inadmissible at trial under
existing law if that suspect were later prosecuted in the United
States.11
This quandary recently was presented to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in the 2001 case
of United States v. Bin Laden.12 The Bin Laden court, facing an issue
of first impression, held that the privilege against self-incrimination
attaches to non-American citizens who are interrogated abroad by
American law enforcement officials.13 The court further held that
Miranda warnings must be provided to these suspects to replicate “to
9. See Karen DeYoung, “Sleeper Cells” of Al Qaeda Are Next Target, WASH. POST, Dec.
3, 2001, at A1 (referring to President George W. Bush’s statement that the war against the
Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan was “only the beginning of a years-long battle against
terrorism”); see also Naftali Bendavid, Obstacles Abound in Global Probe, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30,
2001, at C3 (stating that the FBI had already begun to investigate the events of September 11,
2001, in at least thirty countries around the world).
10. See infra notes 271–272 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
12. 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
13. See id. at 181 (holding that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to non-
Americans who are interrogated abroad but tried in the United States).
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the maximum extent reasonably possible . . . what rights would be
present if the interrogation were being conducted in America.”14
This Article explores in detail the Fifth Amendment issues that
confronted the Bin Laden court.15 As modern crime becomes
increasingly international in scope, other federal courts, and
ultimately the Supreme Court, will undoubtedly be forced to confront
these issues in the future. Part I provides a detailed examination of
the recent Bin Laden decision. Part II briefly explores the history of
constitutional confession law and the Miranda doctrine. Part III
addresses whether the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination applies to non-American citizens who are tried in this
country after being interrogated and making statements abroad, and
concludes that the Bin Laden court—although its analysis was
incomplete—correctly held that it does.
Having concluded that the privilege attaches to such suspects,
Part IV examines whether this fact mandates a strict adherence to the
domestic dictates of Miranda abroad or whether the Miranda
doctrine can be modified when appropriate to accommodate
differences in international law and custom. This Part contends that
Miranda should be interpreted as a flexible, prophylactic rule, which
can in fact be modified or discarded in situations abroad in which its
application is illogical. Part V, therefore, critiques the analysis of the
Bin Laden court, and concludes that the Bin Laden court’s holding on
this point was fundamentally flawed. In this respect, this Part asserts
that the Bin Laden court did not adequately recognize the balance of
competing policies that supports Miranda and its exclusionary rule,
nor did it acknowledge the prophylactic and flexible nature of the
Miranda doctrine that naturally flows from this balance. As a result,
14. Id. at 188.
15. This Article does not address whether Miranda warnings are required when foreign law
enforcement officials, as opposed to American law enforcement officials, conduct the
interrogation abroad and the suspect is later brought to the United States to stand trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 69 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that Miranda does not apply
when foreign officers conduct an interrogation, but setting aside whether foreign officers could
conspire with American officials in a “joint willful attempt to evade the strictures of Miranda”);
Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that Miranda does not apply
when foreign officers conduct interrogation); United States v. Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1364, 1375
(D. Me. 1981) (holding that where American “agents do not actively participate in the arrest
and interrogation, the failure to give Miranda warnings does not invoke the Fifth Amendment
exclusionary rule”). This Article also does not address whether American law enforcement
officials must administer Miranda warnings to American citizens abroad. Thus, this Article
focuses solely on interrogations conducted by American law enforcement, outside the
boundaries of the United States, when the suspect is not an American citizen.
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the court established a Miranda scheme in the international context
that is impractical, unworkable, and unduly burdensome of law
enforcement without offering sufficient countervailing protections to
civil liberties.
Accordingly, Part VI sets forth an alternative framework—a
modification to Miranda in the international context—for future
cases. This Part proposes a Miranda exception in which American law
enforcement agents acting abroad must simply inform alien suspects
of the rights that they enjoy in the country where the interrogation
takes place, to the extent such rights can reasonably be determined by
the agents under the exigencies of the circumstances. Thus, if the
interrogation takes place in China, where neither the right to remain
silent nor the right to counsel during an interrogation is recognized by
law,16 then no Miranda-type warnings would be required. The only
requirement for admissibility in such a circumstance would be that
the confession was made voluntarily. Furthermore, as long as the
federal agents advise their suspects of their rights under foreign law in
good faith, any mistakes made by the agents in interpreting those
rights would not result in the application of the exclusionary rule.
I.  UNITED STATES V. BIN LADEN
Bin Laden involved the prosecution of several members of the al
Qaeda network who were allegedly responsible for the terrorist
attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7,
1998,17 which killed 213 people, twelve of whom were Americans.18
Following the bombing in Kenya, which violated both Kenyan and
American law,19 a team of FBI agents and other American law
enforcement officers proceeded to Nairobi, Kenya, to investigate.20
On August 12, 1998, FBI agents received a tip that led them to the
Nairobi hotel room of defendant Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-
’Owhali.21 Upon finding Al-’Owhali in his room, the Kenyan National
Police, who had accompanied the FBI, arrested Al-’Owhali without a
16. See infra notes 271–272 and accompanying text.
17. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 172–73, 179–81.
18. Death Penalty Sought For Convicted Bomber, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 20, 2001,
at A5.
19. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
20. Id. at 172.
21. Id. at 173.
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warrant due to his lack of identification papers.22 Under Kenyan law,
the absence of identification papers was a valid basis for arrest.23
Upon transporting Al-’Owhali to the headquarters of the
Kenyan National Police, an FBI agent administered to him the
following Miranda warnings, which had been modified from the
standard domestic Miranda warnings to reflect the fact that the
interrogation was taking place in Kenya and in accordance with
Kenyan law:
We are representatives of the United States Government. Under
our laws, you have certain rights. Before we ask you any questions,
we want to be sure that you understand those rights.
You do not have to speak to us or answer any questions. Even if you
have already spoken to the Kenyan authorities, you do not have to
speak to us now.
If you do speak with us, anything that you say may be used against
you in a court in the United States or elsewhere.
In the United States, you would have the right to talk to a lawyer to
get advice before we ask you any questions and you could have a
lawyer with you during questioning. In the United States, if you
could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you
wish, before any questioning.
Because we are not in the United States, we cannot ensure that you
will have a lawyer appointed for you before any questioning.
If you decide to speak with us now, without a lawyer present, you
will still have the right to stop answering questions at any time.
You should also understand that if you decide not to speak with us,
that fact cannot be used as evidence against you in a court in the
United States.
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my
rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I
do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am
doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no
pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.24
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 173–74 (emphasis added). This warning was read to Al-’Owhali from a standard
advice of rights form that frequently has been used by American law enforcement overseas. Id.
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After indicating that he understood these rights, Al-’Owhali
agreed to speak to the investigators.25 Between August 12 and August
21, while in the custody of the Kenyan National Police, Al-’Owhali
was interviewed by the FBI on several occasions, and he continually
denied his involvement in the bombing.26 On August 21, however,
FBI agents confronted Al-’Owhali with all the evidence they had
collected linking him to the Kenyan bombing.27 “[A]cknowledging
that the agents ‘knew everything,’” Al-’Owhali stated that he would
tell the truth about his role in the bombing if he could be tried in the
United States rather than in Kenya.28 At that point, an Assistant
United States Attorney, who was assisting the FBI in its questioning
of Al-’Owhali, administered from memory the standard domestic
Miranda warnings—without making reference to the modified
Kenyan version of the warnings that had been administered to him
previously.29 Al-’Owhali proceeded to implicate himself in the
Kenyan bombing in detail.30
After being brought to the United States for trial, Al-’Owhali
moved to suppress all the statements he had made to the American
investigators in Kenya on the ground that the modified Miranda
warnings that had been administered to him when he was first taken
into Kenyan custody were deficient under American law.31 He argued,
in essence, that the modified warnings advised him of the limited right
to counsel in light of the uncertainties of Kenyan law rather than the
unambiguous American right to counsel as required by the Miranda
decision.32 The government responded that, as a non-American whose
only connection to America was hostile, Al-’Owhali was not
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination, and thus, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings in
the first place.33 As a result, the government contended the failure to
at 173. It was first read to him in English, of which he had some comprehension, and was then
translated into Arabic, his native tongue. Id. at 173–74.
25. Id. at 174.
26. Id. at 175.
27. Id. at 175–76.
28. Id. at 176.
29. Id. at 176–77.
30. Id. at 177.
31. Id. at 171–72, 181.
32. Id. at 181.
33. See Letter from Mary Jo White, United States Attorney, to Hon. Leonard B. Sand 1
(Dec. 11, 2000) (concerning United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023)) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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give correct Miranda warnings could not be a basis for suppression.
The government argued alternatively that even if the court were to
rule that the Fifth Amendment attached to Al-’Owhali, the modified
warnings that he received were sufficient to satisfy Miranda under the
circumstances.34
The Bin Laden court disagreed with the government on both
points. First, the court held that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination did in fact apply to Al-’Owhali.35 Second,
the court held that Miranda’s requirements must be satisfied in
overseas interrogations just as they must be satisfied in domestic
interrogations.36 In doing so, the Bin Laden court interpreted Miranda
and its progeny to require four “warnings” in all international cases.
According to the decision, a suspect must be told that: he has the
right to remain silent and anything that he does say may be used
against him in a court of law; if he were in the United States, he
would have an absolute right to counsel before and during any
questioning; because he is not in the United States, his right to an
attorney depends on foreign law, but the United States government
will do its best to help him obtain retained or appointed counsel, if
the suspect desires, by making that request of the host country; and if
the foreign authorities will not provide him with a lawyer, he does not
have to speak with United States authorities, and if he does choose to
speak, he may stop at any time.37 The Bin Laden court further
required FBI agents abroad to make “a detailed inquiry into a
specific nation’s law”38 regarding what Miranda-type rights are
available to the suspect, and speak to local authorities to determine
whether they will allow the suspect to consult with an attorney.39 This
process must be undertaken in an attempt to provide the suspect with
the same rights he would enjoy if he were being interrogated in the
United States.40 Because the modified Miranda warnings did not
34. Id. at 5–6.
35. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 181. Bin Laden also dealt with a suppression motion
brought on similar grounds by a codefendant of Al-’Owhali’s. Id. at 172. That part of the court’s
decision, however, will not be addressed in this Article because it does not add to the relevant
analysis.
36. Id. at 181.
37. See id. at 187–88, 188 n.16. Although the Bin Laden court did not set forth its
requirements in a numeric order, these four warnings can be synthesized from the court’s
discussion.
38. Id. at 192 n.23.
39. Id. at 188 n.16 and accompanying text.
40. Id. at 188.
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accomplish all of these things, the court suppressed the statements
made by Al-’Owhali following these warnings.41 The court further
ruled that the statements made by Al-’Owhali after the Assistant
United States Attorney later recited the full domestic warnings to him
could be admitted into evidence, as these warnings cured the
deficiencies in the previously administered modified version of the
Miranda warnings.42
As set forth in the remaining sections of this Article, the Bin
Laden court was correct in holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination protects non-Americans interrogated abroad but tried
in the United States. The court’s analysis of the warnings required
pursuant to Miranda was flawed, however. The court utterly failed to
recognize the flexible, prophylactic nature of the Miranda doctrine,
and in creating the warnings required in the international context, the
court did not analyze the competing interests and the balancing test
that determine Miranda’s applicability to new scenarios.
Consequently, the court established an unworkable international
Miranda framework that is unduly burdensome on law enforcement
interests without offering countervailing protections to civil liberties.
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONFESSION LAW
AND THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
The Fifth Amendment reads, in pertinent part, “No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”43 This privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
means, in its simplest form, that a criminal defendant cannot be
compelled to testify about the acts that he is charged with committing
or about anything else that might incriminate him.44 In 1897, the
Supreme Court in Bram v. United States45 first held that a pretrial
41. Id. at 192.
42. Id. at 192–94.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972) (“[The Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination] protects against any disclosures that the witness
reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used.”); see also Brian R. Boch, Fourteenth Amendment—The Standard of Mental
Competency to Waive Constitutional Rights Versus the Competency Standard to Stand Trial, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 888–89 (1994) (observing that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination protects individuals from being forced to “testify” against
themselves).
45. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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confession made “involuntarily” is inadmissible pursuant to the
privilege against self-incrimination.46 The rationale behind this
extension of the privilege from trial testimony to pretrial confessions
is that if the police pressure a suspect to give a confession against his
will, and if that confession is later used against him at trial, the
suspect has essentially been compelled to testify against himself at
trial.47
After Bram, however, the Court began to ignore the privilege
against self-incrimination as a basis for finding confessions
inadmissible and focused instead on the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.48 As the Supreme Court
summarized in Dickerson v. United States,49 “for the middle third of
the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced
confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process.
We applied the due process voluntariness test in ‘some 30 different
46. Id. at 565. Although the privilege against self-incrimination protects against the
admission into evidence of incriminating statements of any type that were made “involuntarily,”
this Article refers to all such statements with the generic term “confession” for the sake of
simplicity.
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461–66 (1966); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 440 (1974) ("Although the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might be
construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify
against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited."); Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) ("The Amendment not only protects the individual against being
involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him
not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings."); Charles J.
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1844 n.97 (1987) (discussing the rationale behind the extension of the
privilege against self-incrimination to pretrial interrogations).
48. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515–20 (1963) (finding a confession
involuntary under a due process “voluntariness” test); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235–
42 (1940) (same).
49. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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cases decided during [that] era.’”50 The Supreme Court summarized
its due process voluntariness jurisprudence in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte:51
“The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly
established test in Anglo-American courts for two-hundred years:
the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he
has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his
will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.”
In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a
particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all of the
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused
and the details of the interrogation. Some of the factors taken into
account have included the youth of the accused, his lack of
education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the
accused of his constitutional rights, the length of the detention, the
50. Id. at 433–34 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)). As a
result, it was unclear during that time whether Bram was still good law, and whether the
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable during a pretrial interrogation. In Haynes, for
example, the defendant was arrested for robbing a gas station and was taken into police custody.
373 U.S. at 505. Although he orally admitted his guilt, the local police refused to allow the
defendant to call his wife, to contact an attorney, or to be arraigned before a magistrate until he
agreed to sign a written confession. Id. at 507–11. Finally, after being held incommunicado with
the outside world for more than sixteen hours, the defendant agreed to sign the written
confession. Id. at 504. At trial, the defendant was convicted after the government introduced his
written confession into evidence. Id. After the defendant appealed his conviction to the
Supreme Court, the Court held that the due process test for whether a confession is admissible
is whether it was made “‘freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.’”
Id. at 513 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)). To determine whether a
confession is voluntarily made, a court must consider “all of the attendant circumstances.” Id.
The Court held that the defendant “was alone in the hands of the police, with no one to advise
or aid him, and he had ‘no reason not to believe that the police had ample power to carry out
their threats,’ to continue, for a much longer period if need be, the incommunicado detention.”
Id. at 514 (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)). Because the confession in
Haynes “was obtained in an atmosphere of substantial coercion and inducement created by
statements and actions of state authorities,” id. at 513, the Court ruled that it had not been made
voluntarily and should not have been admitted into evidence pursuant to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 515–18. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction
was overturned. Id. at 520. The Court in Haynes did not mention the privilege against self-
incrimination.
51. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of
physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.52
This due process “voluntariness test” was the governing inquiry for
the admissibility of pretrial confessions until the Miranda decision in
1966.53
In Miranda v. Arizona,54 the Supreme Court changed the initial
inquiry from a voluntariness standard to a warning/waiver
presumption, and simultaneously altered much of the focus of
confession law from due process back to the privilege against self-
incrimination.55 Miranda made clear once and for all that the privilege
against self-incrimination—in addition to the Due Process Clause—
protects suspects from police coercion during pretrial interrogations.
Miranda established the now familiar principle that, before engaging
a suspect in “custodial interrogation,”56 law enforcement officials
must inform the suspect that he has the right to remain silent, that his
statements may be used against him at trial, and that he may have
retained or appointed counsel during the interrogation.57 The
prophylactic Miranda safeguards were designed to protect the suspect
from coerced self-incrimination by counteracting the inherently
compelling and intimidating pressures of custodial interrogation,
thereby creating an environment where a suspect can freely and
knowingly invoke his constitutional rights if he so desires.58 The
52. Id. at 225–26 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)) (citations
omitted).
53. See generally Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997) (discussing the
history of the privilege against self-incrimination and the voluntariness test).
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. Both Miranda and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overturning a state gambling
conviction when the defendant was held in contempt because he refused to answer questions
about the charge), returned the focus to the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 457–58; Malloy, 378 U.S. at 5–14; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434
(2000) (“[O]ur decisions in Malloy . . . and Miranda changed the focus of much of the inquiry in
determining the admissibility” of confessions from a due process inquiry to a focus on the
privilege against self-incrimination); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442–44 (1974) (noting
that Miranda returned much of the focus of confession law to the privilege against self-
incrimination).
56. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
57. Id. at 444–45; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, “TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE” SERIES, REPORT NO. 1: THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986),
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 485–91 (1989) (discussing the obligations that
Miranda places on police officers).
58. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda
Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 805, 806–07 (1992) (explaining that Miranda warnings
GODSEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/24/02  3:52 PM
1718 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1703
Supreme Court employed the exclusionary rule as a means of
deterring police officers from ignoring the mandates of Miranda: if
the police do not disclose to a suspect his rights before the
interrogation begins, the prosecution may not use the suspect’s
subsequent incriminating statements against him during its case-in-
chief.59
The Supreme Court subsequently made clear that Miranda, and
its focus on the privilege against self-incrimination, were not intended
to completely abandon the due process voluntariness test, but rather
were intended to add a new layer of analysis on top of the preexisting
standard.60 If, for example, a suspect waived his Miranda rights, but
his confession were nevertheless made involuntarily as a result of
undue police coercion, the confession would still be suppressed under
the former due process “voluntariness” test.61
were designed to counteract the compelling pressures of custodial interrogation). Although the
Miranda decision established that suspects have a right to counsel during a custodial
interrogation, the Court derived this right from the privilege against self-incrimination rather
than the separate right to counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment. The Miranda court
reasoned that the presence of defense counsel during an interrogation would lessen the coercive
atmosphere of an interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465–67, 469–70.
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476–77; see also Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent
Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9 (2001) (discussing the fact that “the conventional
case for the exclusionary rule rests on deterrence”).
60. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (stating that “[w]e have never abandoned this due process
jurisprudence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily,” and
noting that Miranda added an additional layer of protection based upon the privilege against
self-incrimination).
61. Id.; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“We do not suggest
that compliance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent
confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-
incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities
adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”). In the 1930s, when the Supreme Court began
overturning state convictions in which involuntary confessions had been introduced, the Court
used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the textually more
appropriate privilege, because the privilege had not yet been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship
Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession
Rule (Pt. 2), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 519–20 (1992). Thus, the only option that the Court had at its
disposal to exclude a confession was to find a corollary to the privilege within the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, when the Court finally ruled in 1964 in Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964), that the privilege applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, it seemed logical that the Court would have soon thereafter substituted the
privilege against self-incrimination for the Due Process Clause as the primary basis for
excluding confessions that offend the Constitution. This, however, did not occur. Dickerson, 530
U.S. at 434; Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (“The Court has retained [a] due
process focus, even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States.”).
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Thus, Miranda created a presumption that if the suspect were
adequately advised of his rights and knowingly waived those rights,
any statements by the suspect that followed were made voluntarily.
Like all presumptions, however, this presumption could be rebutted.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to
Miranda by ruling that certain circumstances exist where a police
officer does not have to Mirandize a suspect.62 Whenever Miranda
does not apply, however, the confession will still be suppressed if it
were made involuntarily pursuant to the due process voluntariness
test.63
Thus, the due process voluntariness doctrine and the Miranda
doctrine work in tandem. If Miranda warnings were not given, then
the confession must be suppressed pursuant to the privilege against
self-incrimination unless the facts fit within an exception to Miranda.
If, on the other hand, Miranda was satisfied (either because the
proper warnings were given or the facts fit within a Miranda
exception) the confession may still be inadmissible under the Due
Process Clause if, due to police coercion, it was made involuntarily. It
is axiomatic that because Miranda is a presumption designed to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda warnings
must be administered only to those individuals who may properly
claim Fifth Amendment protection. The first step in determining
whether Miranda warnings must be administered to non-Americans
abroad, therefore, is to determine whether such individuals may
properly claim protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
III.  THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION TO NON-AMERICANS ABROAD
WHO ARE LATER TRIED IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Ascending Scale of Rights Test
Prior to the decision of the Bin Laden court, no court had
directly addressed the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination to non-Americans who were interrogated abroad and
62. See infra Part IV.B.
63. See infra Part IV.B.
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then tried in the United States.64 Finding no controlling precedent, the
government argued in Bin Laden that the defendant, Al-’Owhali, was
64. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that it was
addressing an issue “of first impression”). A handful of cases purport at first glance to address
the issue, but upon closer examination provide limited guidance. In United States v. Welch, 455
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972), for example, the defendant was arrested by the Bahamian police at a
bank in the Bahamas where he was attempting to deposit a United States treasury bill that had
been stolen from a bank in New York City. Id. at 212. After being taken to police headquarters,
the defendant made incriminating statements to the Bahamian police without first having been
advised of his complete Miranda rights. Id. at 212–13. After being brought to the United States
for trial, the defendant moved to suppress those statements pursuant to Miranda. Id. at 212. In
upholding the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, the Second Circuit
ruled that “since the Miranda requirements were primarily designed to prevent United States
police officers from relying upon improper interrogation techniques and as the requirements
have little, if any, deterrent effect upon foreign police officers, the Miranda warnings should not
serve as the sine qua non of admissibility.” Id. at 213. Because Miranda’s exclusionary rule was
designed to deter American police officers from ignoring the dictates of that decision, applying
the rule to the Bahamian police—who may not be aware of the Miranda decision and who are
not bound by American law—would have little additional impact in protecting the privilege.
The Welch decision was in accord with a line of cases from various circuits holding that Miranda
does not apply to interrogations abroad that are conducted by foreign—as opposed to
American—law enforcement officials. See supra note 15; infra note 321; see also Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued,
84 AM. J. INT’L L. 444, 454–55 (1990) (discussing the line of cases holding that Miranda does not
apply to interrogations conducted by foreign police). Having dispensed with Miranda, the Welch
court then went on to note, without significant discussion, that the defendant’s confession was
voluntary and thus the admission of his confession at trial did not run afoul of the privilege
against self-incrimination. 455 F.2d at 213. By applying the privilege’s voluntariness test to the
facts of that case, the Welch court suggested—or, more correctly, assumed for argument’s
sake—that the privilege applies abroad.
Similarly, both the Fifth Circuit in Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1973),
and the Ninth Circuit in Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), agreed with the
Second Circuit in Welch that Miranda’s exclusionary rule does not apply to interrogations
conducted by foreign police, and noted in dicta that the confessions in those cases were
voluntary and did not run afoul of the privilege against self-incrimination. Kilday, 481 F.2d at
655–56; Brulay, 383 F.2d at 348. Welch, Brulay, and Kilday, however, hardly can be said to
constitute definitive rulings on the application of the privilege to non-Americans abroad. First,
the defendant in Brulay was an American citizen. 383 F.2d at 349. The other two decisions did
not even mention the nationality of their respective defendants. Given the facts of Kilday and
Welch, where significant parts of the crimes in question occurred in the United States, it is quite
possible that those courts did not address the citizenship issue because the defendants in each
case were Americans. Kilday, 481 F.2d at 655; Welch, 455 F.2d at 212. In none of the
aforementioned cases was there any credible suggestion that the confessions were involuntary,
and therefore, these courts simply mentioned in passing that the privilege against self-
incrimination would not provide an additional basis for relief. These cases did not directly
address the issue or offer a level of analysis suggesting that the courts were ruling squarely on
the tricky issue of the extraterritorial application of the privilege to non-Americans abroad. It is
perhaps for these reasons that the Bin Laden court cited this line of cases in a footnote and
correctly noted that they provided only “limited” guidance in determining whether the privilege
applies to aliens abroad. 132 F. Supp. 2d at 182 n.9.
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not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination because he
was not an American citizen and his only contacts with the United
States were hostile in nature.65 This argument was based upon two
Supreme Court cases, Johnson v. Eisentrager66 and United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez,67 both of which held that certain constitutional
rights do not apply extraterritorially to non-Americans who have
little or no connection to the United States. In Eisentrager, twenty-
one German nationals petitioned a federal court in the United States
for writs of habeas corpus on the ground that their trial, convictions,
and imprisonment had not comported with the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.68 The German nationals, who had served in
China in the German armed forces during World War II, had been
convicted by an American military commission in China, and they
were serving their sentences in China under the control of American
military authorities.69 After the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia dismissed the petitions, the court of appeals
reversed, holding that the Fifth Amendment’s seemingly all-inclusive
language—“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law”—means that its application is
not limited to American citizens.70 The Supreme Court reversed,
stating that “[t]he Court of Appeals has cited no authority whatever
for holding that the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons,
whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and whatever
Furthermore, in the 1897 case of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the
defendant, a crewman on an American vessel, allegedly committed a murder upon the high seas
and was interrogated by Canadian police when his ship arrived in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Id. at
537. The defendant made incriminating statements to the Canadian officers during the
interrogation, and was eventually transported back to Massachusetts to stand trial for murder.
Id. After appealing his conviction to the United States Supreme Court, the Court reversed his
conviction on the ground that the defendant had made the incriminating statements
involuntarily as a result of pressure applied by the Canadian police. Id. at 562–65. The Court did
not discuss the extraterritorial application of the privilege against self-incrimination in the
decision, but simply analyzed the facts of the case as if it were assumed that the privilege applies
in Canada where the interrogation took place. Because the defendant in that case was an
American citizen, however, Bram also provides limited guidance in determining the application
of the privilege to non-Americans interrogated abroad.
65. 132 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
66. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
67. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
68. 339 U.S. at 767.
69. Id. at 765–67.
70. Id. at 781.
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their offenses.”71 The Court noted that “[t]he alien, to whom the
United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity
with our society.”72 Presence in the country confers certain rights
upon aliens, which expands once citizenship is obtained.73 Because the
petitioners were non-Americans who were located in China and had
“remained in the service of the enemy,” they were not entitled to the
due process protections of the Fifth Amendment.74
In Verdugo-Urquidez, agents of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) arrested a Mexican citizen and transported
him to the United States to stand trial for smuggling narcotics into the
United States.75 Following his arrest, DEA agents searched the
defendant’s Mexican home without a warrant and found
incriminating evidence therein.76 Prior to trial, the defendant moved
to suppress the evidence found during the search on the ground that
the DEA agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching
his home without a warrant.77 After the district court and court of
appeals both agreed with the defendant and suppressed the
evidence,78 the Supreme Court reversed.79 Central to its holding were
the facts that the defendant was not an American citizen and the
search in question took place beyond the borders of the United
States.80 The Court distinguished a line of cases that had extended
71. Id. at 783.
72. Id. at 770.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 776. In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that when the U.S. government acts
with respect to American citizens located abroad, those citizens are entitled to the protections
of the U.S. Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
75. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990).
76. Id. at 262–63.
77. Id. at 263.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 274–75.
80. Id.
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certain constitutional rights to non-Americans81 on the ground that
the alleged constitutional violations in those cases had all occurred
within the United States.82 The Court recognized that “once an alien
lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our
borders.”83 But because the defendant was “an alien who has had no
previous significant voluntary connection with the United States,” his
claim for Fourth Amendment protection was denied. 84
Thus, in Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court
set forth a test by which aliens are granted certain constitutional
protections to the extent that they have voluntarily connected
themselves with the United States. In the Bin Laden case, Al-’Owhali
was not a citizen of the United States, was not present in the United
States when he was interrogated, and his only connection to the
United States was hostile in nature—his attack against the American
embassy in Kenya. If one were to apply this test to Al-’Owhali, as the
government urged the Bin Laden court to do, one would have to
conclude that he was not protected by the Fifth Amendment, and
thus, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings. Accordingly, his
motion to suppress presumably would have been summarily denied.
B. Rejecting the Ascending Scale of Rights Test for the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination
As set forth in this Article, the ascending scale of rights test does
not apply to the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination for two reasons. Most importantly, the privilege against
81. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (confirming that illegal aliens are protected
by the Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)
(determining that a resident alien is a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment);
Bridges v. Wixson, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (reminding courts that resident aliens have First
Amendment rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491–92 (1931)
(allowing that “alien friends” on the high seas are protected by the Just Compensation Clause of
the Fifth Amendment when the United States has taken their property); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (inferring from prior case law that resident aliens are entitled to
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (finding that
resident aliens are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection).
82. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (“These cases, however, establish only that aliens
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States
and develop substantial connections with this country.”).
83. Id. (quoting Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953)) (emphasis and
internal citations omitted).
84. Id.
GODSEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/24/02  3:52 PM
1724 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1703
self-incrimination is a trial right only; it is triggered at the time of trial
in the United States, not at the time of the pretrial interrogation in a
foreign country. In addition, the Fifth Amendment employs the
expansive language “no person” rather than the limiting phrase “the
people” that appears in the Fourth Amendment.
1. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Is a Trial Right.
Based upon a strict interpretation of the text of the Fifth Amendment
(“No person . . . shall be compelled to be a witness”) the Supreme
Court has ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination applies
only if and when the defendant becomes a witness against himself at
his criminal trial.85 Therefore, if a law enforcement officer were to use
brute force and torture to extract an involuntary confession from a
suspect, the officer would not at that time have violated the privilege
because the suspect would not yet have testified against himself at
trial.86 If, however, the suspect were later prosecuted and the
government introduced his involuntary confession into evidence
against him, he would then be considered a witness against himself,
and the Fifth Amendment violation would occur.
This distinction is made clear in the line of federal cases dealing
with governmental grants of immunity to witnesses. In Kastigar v.
United States,87 for example, the petitioners had been subpoenaed to
testify as witnesses before a federal grand jury.88 The petitioners
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused to
testify.89 In response, the government applied to the district court for
an order, pursuant to a federal statute, that granted the petitioners
immunity from prosecution.90 After the district court immunized the
85. Id. at 264.
86. It should be noted, of course, that police conduct that “shocks the conscience” would
violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against deprivation of “life, liberty, or property,
without the due process of law.” Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)). This police conduct would also violate the
due process “voluntariness” test. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
87. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
88. Id. at 442.
89. Id.
90. Id. In response to the government’s request, the district court granted immunity to the
petitioners, id., pursuant to the authority vested in it by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994), which states:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to—(1) a
court or grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or (3)
either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or
subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding
GODSEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/24/02  3:52 PM
2002] MIRANDA’S FINAL FRONTIER 1725
petitioners, however, they still refused to testify and were held in
contempt and detained until they agreed to do so.91 In discussing the
constitutionality of statutes that authorize the government to
immunize a witness and then compel his testimony, the Supreme
Court made clear that the “sole concern” of the privilege was not the
forcible extraction of testimony, but rather the use of such testimony
to inflict criminal penalties upon the witness.92 Once a witness has
been granted immunity and, as a consequence, cannot be prosecuted
based upon his testimony, the privilege against self-incrimination no
longer prohibits the government from forcibly extracting
incriminating statements from that witness.93 The Supreme Court
concluded in Kastigar that when witnesses are granted immunity and
still refuse to testify, the government may forcibly compel their
testimony—without violating their Fifth Amendment rights—by
detaining them until they agree to take the witness stand. 94
In contrast, the Fourth Amendment protects privacy rights by
prohibiting “unreasonable searches and seizures” regardless of
whether the evidence collected during the search is later introduced
at a criminal trial in the United States.95 The defendant in Verdugo-
Urquidez argued that the government had violated this protection
when the DEA agents searched his home without a warrant.96 The
defendant asserted that because he was present in the United States
during his trial, and the government was attempting to introduce
evidence obtained during its warrantless search at that trial, he should
communicates to the witness an order issued under this title, the witness may not
refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
91. 406 U.S. at 442.
92. Id. at 453.
93. Id.; see also Mahoney v. Kesery, 976 F.2d 1054, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not protect a witness after he or she
has been granted immunity).
94. 406 U.S. at 442.
95. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures “whether or not the evidence
is sought to be used in a criminal trial”); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973)
(noting that, in contrast to the Fifth Amendment, “[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment
are of a wholly different order . . . and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair
ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial”).
96. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262–63.
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be protected by the Fourth Amendment.97 The Supreme Court ruled
in Verdugo-Urquidez, however, that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment is “fully accomplished” at the time of the unlawful
search in question—not when the evidence is introduced later at
trial.98 The defendant’s home was located in Mexico, and, as a result,
the government conduct that was alleged to be unconstitutional
occurred solely outside of the United States.99 Since the defendant
was a non-American who could only claim an alleged violation
outside of the United States, he had no Fourth Amendment
protection.100 Thus, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are different in
the sense that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs, if at all, when
the “unreasonable” search takes place and not at trial when the
evidence collected during the search is introduced. The Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, on the other hand,
is a trial right, and can be triggered only in a courtroom setting when
the defendant’s confession is introduced and he becomes a “witness”
against himself.
In light of this distinction, whether the interrogation occurs
within the borders of the United States or abroad becomes
immaterial to the applicability of the privilege if the suspect later
stands trial in the United States. In the Bin Laden case, for example,
the defendant Al-’Owhali was interrogated in Kenya. Despite the
government’s arguments to the contrary, this fact plays no part in the
legal analysis. Indeed, the alleged constitutional violation against Al-
’Owhali—the introduction of his confession—occurred within the
territory of the United States in the courtroom in New York City
where he was tried. It is for this reason that the Bin Laden court
chastised the government because it:
incorrectly frame[d] the legal issue as one dependent on the
extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment. Whether or not
Fifth Amendment rights reach out to protect individuals while they
are situated outside the United States is beside the point. This is
because any violation of the privilege against self-incrimination
occurs, not at the moment law enforcement officials coerce
statements through custodial interrogation, but when a defendant’s
involuntary statements are actually used against him at an American
97. Id.
98. Id. at 264.
99. Id. at 274–75.
100. Id.
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criminal proceeding . . . . The violation of the Defendant’s rights
here, if any, is clearly prospective, and so the relevant question is the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination as to non-resident
aliens presently inside the United States and subject to domestic
criminal proceedings. . . .101
The court added in a footnote: “It is for this reason that the
Government’s heavy reliance on [the ascending scale of rights test set
forth in Verdugo-Urquidez, Eisentrager and Harbury102] is
fundamentally misplaced. In all three cases, the putative
constitutional injury occurred entirely abroad, thereby necessarily
raising the issue of a specific Amendment’s extraterritorial effect.”103
Thus, once it is understood that a violation of the privilege does
not occur until trial in the United States, the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against self-incrimination can be distinguished from the
rights at stake in those cases in which the Supreme Court adopted the
ascending scale of rights approach. In Verdugo-Urquidez and
Eisentrager, if constitutional violations actually occurred, they
occurred outside of the United States.104 In fact, in connection with
the privilege against self-incrimination, it becomes apparent that the
location of the trial, not the location of the interrogation, is the
dispositive factor. If a non-American who confessed abroad is later
tried in the United States, the question is not whether the privilege
against self-incrimination applies abroad, but whether non-Americans
located within the boundaries of the United States, for the purpose of
101. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citations omitted).
102. In Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Christopher
v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 663 (2001), the plaintiff, a United States citizen, brought suit in federal
court against the United States alleging that American officials of the Central Intelligence
Agency located in Guatemala had participated in the torture and murder of her husband, a
Guatemalan citizen. Id. at 598. She alleged that such conduct violated her husband’s right to due
process under the Fifth Amendment. Id. The D.C. Circuit rejected this claim on that ground
that the plaintiff’s husband, as a non-American, could not claim Fifth Amendment protection
outside of the United States. Id. at 603. The prosecution in Bin Laden had relied on this case in
arguing that Al-’Owhali was not protected by the Fifth Amendment. 132 F. Supp. 2d at 182 n.10.
Because the injury to Al-’Owhali occurred at trial inside the United States, however, Harbury is
distinguishable.
103. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 182 n.10 (citations omitted). Although Al-’Owhali’s
statements were voluntary, it was necessary for the Bin Laden court to perform this Fifth
Amendment analysis. Indeed, as set forth supra at notes 43–63 and accompanying text, the first
step in determining whether Miranda applies is to determine whether the suspect is entitled to
the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination.
104. In Eisentrager the alleged constitutional injury was “fully accomplished” in China. See
infra note 116 and accompanying text. In Verdugo-Urquidez, however, the alleged injury was
fully accomplished in Mexico. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
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attending their criminal trial, are protected by the privilege. Although
the Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination to non-Americans
who are located within the United States, it has ruled that they are
entitled to equal protection rights,105 First Amendment rights,106 just
compensation rights under the Fifth Amendment,107 and certain due
process rights under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.108 As the
Supreme Court expressed in Mathews v. Diaz109 in connection with
the application of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects every one of them from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is
entitled to that constitutional protection.110
105. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (holding that illegal aliens are protected by
the Equal Protection Clause); see generally Monroe Leigh, Recent Case, Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.
Ct. 2382 (1982), 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 151 (1983).
106. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (holding that aliens have First Amendment
rights); see generally Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens?, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (2000) (discussing the application of the First Amendment to
aliens).
107. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491–92 (1931).
108. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that resident aliens are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and stating in dicta that they also are protected by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects resident aliens).
109. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
110. Id. at 77 (citations omitted). A line of Supreme Court cases known as the “Insular
Cases” appear at first glance to contradict the cases discussed supra notes 105–108 and
accompanying text, but, upon closer inspection, these cases are distinguishable. In the Insular
Cases, the Supreme Court held that certain constitutional rights do not apply to citizens of
certain territories of the United States. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–05 (1922)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was inapplicable in Puerto Rico);
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (holding that the Fifth Amendment grand jury
provision was inapplicable in the Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904)
(holding that the right to a jury trial was inapplicable in the Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197, 215–18 (1903) (holding that the provisions on indictment by grand jury and jury
trial were inapplicable in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that the
Revenue Clauses of the Constitution were inapplicable to Puerto Rico). In these cases,
however, the question was whether Congress, in territorializing such places as the Philippines
and Puerto Rico, intended to make them so incorporated into the United States that the entire
Constitution would apply therein. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court interpreted the
treaties and laws in question that gave the United States a degree of sovereign power over these
areas, and answered the question in the negative. E.g., Ocampo, 234 U.S. at 98–99. Thus,
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The Bin Laden court, however, was the first to rule on the application
of the privilege against self-incrimination to aliens who are tried
within the United States. The court correctly held that because the
privilege against self-incrimination is a unique right that can be
violated only at trial in the United States, the ascending-scale of rights
test does not apply to that clause.
2. The Scope of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination is Not
Limited to “the People.” The Bin Laden court was further persuaded
that the privilege protects non-Americans during interrogations
abroad because of the seemingly expansive language of the Fifth
Amendment. Based upon the language of the amendment that “No
person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself,” the court held that the privilege applies to any
“person” prosecuted by the United States, regardless of nationality.111
The court relied upon the Supreme Court’s Verdugo-Urquidez
decision, which held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a
search of an alien’s home located beyond the borders of the United
States,112 as the basis for its ruling.113 The Supreme Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez was persuaded by the fact that the Fourth Amendment
expressly limits its application to “the people.” After analyzing the
use of the phrase “the people” in other parts of the Constitution and
the Framers’ intent in enacting the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court held that this phrase refers “to a class of persons who are part
of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with [the United States] to be considered part of that
community.”114 The Bin Laden court, as a result, contrasted the
Framers’ use of the phrase “the people” in the Fourth Amendment
citizens of the Philippines, for example, were not intended by Congress to be considered so a
part of the United States that they could claim protection of the U.S. Constitution. Id. In
contrast, when a non-American is present within the borders of the United States, as in Plyler,
Bridges, Russian Volunteer Fleet, Wong Wing, and Yick Wo, his position is markedly better, as
the application of the Constitution to such an individual does not turn on the interpretation of
treaties or congressional intent. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268
(1990) (discussing the Insular Cases); see also Michael A. Cabotaje, Comment, Equity Denied:
Historical and Legal Analyses in Support of the Extension of United States Veteran Benefits to
Filipino World War II Veterans, 6 ASIAN L.J. 67, 88–96 (1999) (discussing the Insular Cases).
111. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
112. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
113. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
114. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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with the seemingly broader term “person” in the Fifth Amendment
and stated:
The crucial phrase is “no person” and it neither denotes nor
connotes any limitation in scope, in marked contrast to the use of
“the people” in most of the other Amendments contained within the
Bill of Rights. From the outset, then, these protections [the privilege
against self-incrimination and Miranda] seemingly apply with equal
vigor to all defendants facing criminal prosecution at the hands of
the United States, and without apparent regard to citizenship or
community connection.115
The Bin Laden court unfortunately stopped there, however, and
did not address Eisentrager in its textual analysis. Eisentrager held
that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to German nationals who
were tried by an American military commission in China for war
crimes against the United States.116 The Supreme Court in Eisentrager
expressly focused on the phrase “no person” in the text of the Fifth
Amendment and held that it would be impractical to suggest that this
language “confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality,
wherever they are located and whatever their offense.”117 To do so
would vest non-Americans abroad with First Amendment rights,118
Second Amendment rights,119 and other important constitutional
rights traditionally thought to apply within the borders of the United
115. 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (citations omitted); see also Lowenfield, supra note 64, at 452–54
(contrasting the use of the phrase “the people” in the Fourth Amendment and the phrase “No
person” in the Fifth Amendment).
116. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790 (1950); see also supra notes 68–74 and
accompanying text. The Bin Laden court addressed Eisentrager in a footnote in connection with
its holding that the privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated until trial, see supra
notes 64–67, 102–104 and accompanying text, but failed to focus on Eisentrager in its discussion
of the phrase “No person.”
117. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 783.
118. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
119. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.” Since the Second Amendment employs the phrase “the people,”
it is difficult to understand how the Eisentrager Court believed that an expansive interpretation
of the phrase “No person” in the Fifth Amendment would necessarily mean that non-
Americans abroad could claim protection of the Second Amendment—particularly in light of
Verdugo-Urquidez’s limited interpretation of “the people.”
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States.120 The Supreme Court expressed that “such extraterritorial
application of organic law would have been so significant an
innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended or
apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary
comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court
supports such a view.”121 Forty years later in Verdugo-Urquidez, when
interpreting the limited meaning of “the people” as found in the text
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court cited Eisentrager favorably and
suggested in dicta that the Fifth Amendment’s introductory phrase
“no person” does not necessarily render the protections of the Fifth
Amendment universally applicable.122
An argument can be made, however, that Eisentrager was
intended to be limited to its wartime facts. The Supreme Court’s
primary concern in extending the civil liberties contained in the Bill
of Rights to wartime enemies seemed to be the potentially crippling
effect it would have on the ability of the United States to conduct
warfare.123 The Court explored in detail the American tradition of
vesting the power to deal with citizens of enemy nations exclusively in
the executive branch of government, and noted, “Executive power
over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been
deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security.”124
The Court held that “the nonresident enemy alien, especially one
who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have even
this qualified access to our courts, for he neither has comparable
claims upon our institutions nor could his use of them fail to be
helpful to the enemy.”125 To vest nonresident alien enemies with the
right to bring suit in the United States alleging violations of the Bill of
Rights would “hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the
enemy.”126
Once it is understood that the privilege against self-incrimination
is not triggered until trial, the Eisentrager case can be distinguished
120. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
123. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 773–81.
124. Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 776.
126. Id. at 779. The Eisentrager Court also noted that American servicemen are stripped of
certain constitutional rights when they enter the armed services. To allow wartime enemies to
claim constitutional rights would thereby put them in a better position than our own
servicemen. Id. at 783.
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not simply because it dealt with nonresident enemy aliens, but also
because the petitioners were tried by a military commission in China
and never came within the territory of the United States.127 Indeed,
the Supreme Court held in Wong Wing v. United States,128 albeit in the
context of the Due Process Clause, that the phrase “no person” in the
text of the Fifth Amendment renders the Due Process Clause
applicable “to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality.”129 Because
the privilege against self-incrimination begins with the same “no
person” language as does the Due Process Clause, and because the
privilege can be violated only at trial when the suspect is “within the
territorial jurisdiction” of the United States, Wong Wing’s
interpretation of the phrase “no person” should control.
Thus, the holdings of Verdugo-Urquidez, Eisentrager, and Wong
Wing together suggest that the Fifth Amendment’s use of the phrase
“no person” renders it applicable to all aliens who are within the
territory of the United States when the constitutional violation
occurs. The only limitation established thus far deems the privilege
against self-incrimination inapplicable to suspects who are wartime
enemies tried outside of the United States.130 Any non-American who
is interrogated abroad and then tried in the United States, such as Al-
’Owhali in the Bin Laden case, would therefore be considered a
“person” within the meaning of the privilege against self-
incrimination.131
127. Id. at 763.
128. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
129. Id. at 238 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)) (emphasis added).
130. An argument perhaps could have been made in the Bin Laden case that there should
be a “terrorism exception” to the Miranda rule, given that terrorism is a war-like act and seems
to some extent to be replacing traditional warfare. An individual who is suspected of a terrorist
act against the United States could arguably be considered analogous to an “enemy alien” as the
petitioners were labeled in Eisentrager. This argument, however, was not made in that case.
131. There is perhaps another distinct reason why the privilege against self-incrimination
should apply to aliens tried in the United States, although the Bin Laden court did not address
it. The Supreme Court made clear in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), that confessions
taken in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination are excluded from evidence based
upon the “twin rationales” of protecting civil liberties and ensuring that all confessions admitted
into evidence are trustworthy. Id. at 308. Regarding the “trustworthiness” rationale, when a
confession has been extracted through undue coercion, there is a serious risk that the suspect
may have confessed not because he is guilty, but rather because he could not withstand
additional pressure. As a result, the confession cannot be considered reliable. See Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 546 (1897) (“[P]ain and force may compel men to confess what is
not the truth of facts, and consequently such extorted confessions are not to be depended on.”)
(quoting GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1760)).
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One could argue that the privilege against self-incrimination should extend to non-
Americans tried in the United States regardless of their connection to this country simply
because of this “trustworthiness” rationale. Indeed, if the privilege against self-incrimination is
viewed as a derivative of the “civil liberties” rationale alone, the privilege could be considered
analogous, at least in underlying policy, to the rights embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth Amendment, as explained earlier, is based upon a single rationale (protecting civil
liberties) and therefore provides protection only to citizens and noncitizens with a significant
connection to the United States. In Verdugo-Urquidez, DEA agents seized evidence from the
alien-defendant’s home and later introduced that evidence at trial. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
at 262–63. The fact that the DEA did not follow the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in
that case, however, did not render that evidence unreliable. The evidence (drug-dealing notes
and ledgers) did not suddenly change in form or otherwise become less probative of the fact that
the defendant was a drug dealer simply because the DEA seized it without a warrant. As the
Supreme Court has noted previously, “The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a
wholly different order [than the Fifth Amendment], and have nothing to do with promoting the
fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial . . . . ‘[T]here is no likelihood of unreliability or
coercion present in a search-and-seizure case.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242
(1973) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638 (1965)). The Supreme Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez presumably allowed the introduction of the evidence seized without a warrant not
only because the defendant was a non-American who could not claim Fourth Amendment
protection beyond the borders of the United States, but also because the admission of that
evidence did not raise reliability concerns. See Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. at 264 (“Whether
evidence obtained from respondent’s Mexican residences should be excluded at trial in the
United States is a remedial question separate from the existence vel non of the constitutional
violation.”). In contrast, when a confession is extracted through force and coercion in violation
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the confession’s reliability becomes suspect because
the defendant may have confessed simply to avoid further punishment. This concern does not
suddenly disappear when the defendant on trial is not a citizen of this country, as the United
States has an interest in the proper administration of its courts regardless of the nationality of
the defendant on trial.
In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), however, the Supreme Court arguably
undercut this argument. In Connelly, the defendant was a schizophrenic who unexpectedly
walked up to a police officer and confessed to a murder after he heard “voices from God”
commanding him to confess or kill himself. Id. at 160–61. Connelly argued that despite the fact
that the police did not coerce or otherwise apply any pressure to him, the confession should be
excluded pursuant to the privilege against self-incrimination because it was “compelled” against
his will by a mental defect, and as a result, it was not trustworthy. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument. In doing so, the Court simply could have stated that the privilege is triggered
only through state action. The Court seemed to go out of its way, however, to suggest that
“trustworthiness” was not a concern of the privilege, and that “[t]he sole concern of [the
privilege] is governmental coercion.” Id. at 170 (emphasis added). This ruling followed on the
heels of Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), in which the Court stated: “The privilege against
self-incrimination enjoined by the Fifth Amendment is not designed to enhance the reliability of
the factfinding determination; it stands in the Constitution for entirely independent reasons.”
Id. at 375. The language of Connelly and Allen suggests that the Supreme Court has limited the
basis of the privilege against self-incrimination solely to the “civil liberties” rationale, and has
removed the “trustworthiness” underpinnings of that clause.
Professor Herman, however, offers an alternative interpretation of these cases:
The Court’s [statement in Connelly], that “[t]he sole concern of the Fifth
Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion,” should
be read to mean only that governmental action is an essential trigger for Fifth
Amendment analysis. It should not be read to mean that the constitutional
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IV.  THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE ABROAD DOES NOT
MANDATE A STRICT ADHERENCE TO MIRANDA IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA, AS MIRANDA IS A PROPHYLACTIC
RULE THAT CAN BE CONTOURED TO FIT NEW SCENARIOS
Having concluded that the privilege against self-incrimination
protects non-Americans interrogated abroad who are later tried in
the United States, the next question is how the protections of the
privilege operate in the international arena.132 This is a tricky
question: if the privilege operates abroad in the same manner in
which it operates at home, American law enforcement officials
overseas would be required to Mirandize suspects prior to custodial
interrogation even though the laws of many foreign nations do not
provide criminal suspects with the same set of constitutional rights
embodied in Miranda.133 If, for example, an FBI agent conducting a
custodial interrogation abroad were to inform a non-American that
he has the right to an attorney during the interrogation, and if the law
of that country dictated that criminal suspects were not entitled to an
attorney until trial, the FBI agent would be misleading the suspect
while fulfilling Miranda’s mandate.
Miranda and its supporting cases operate upon two basic
assumptions that are not entirely applicable in the international
arena. Namely, the assumptions that all suspects enjoy the rights
embodied in the Bill of Rights and that the protections to civil
liberties provided by the rule are effective and, on balance, outweigh
any countervailing costs to the police and to society. However, the
Supreme Court has held that in circumstances in which enforcing the
privilege has no concern for reliability, even in cases in which there is
governmental coercion. Thus, Connelly, in common with Tehan and Allen,
should be read as saying no more than that the privilege has no free-standing
concern for reliability, that is, a concern that is independent of governmental
coercion.
Herman, supra note 61, at 515. Although Professor Herman offers a plausible route for the
Court to limit its language in Connelly and Allen, if it so desired, the Supreme Court has not yet
expounded upon the seemingly unambiguous statements in these two decisions. Thus, it is not
clear at this time whether the “twin rationales” doctrine espoused in Oregon v. Elstad remains
viable. If the Supreme Court interprets its recent decisions as Professor Herman suggests it
should, then the “trustworthiness” rationale could be considered an independent reason to
extend the protections of the privilege to non-Americans who are interrogated abroad and tried
in the United States.
132. This question assumes that the intent of the investigation is to prosecute the non-
American culprits in the United States. Of course, if a foreign nation ultimately prosecutes the
suspects, then the Fifth Amendment is not implicated.
133. See infra notes 247–248, 271–272 and accompanying text.
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Miranda doctrine would not create the same type of balance between
competing social policies that the Miranda decision envisioned,
exceptions to the rule can be made.
The operation of the privilege against self-incrimination
ultimately depends upon whether the Miranda doctrine is a
constitutional mandate such that it must be followed in virtually every
situation where the privilege attaches, or whether it is a flexible,
prophylactic rule that may be modified or dispensed with when
appropriate. Section A below discusses Miranda’s status as a
prophylactic rule instead of a constitutional mandate. Section B
explores some of the exceptions to the Miranda doctrine and
demonstrates how these exceptions illustrate Miranda’s prophylactic
nature. Section C focuses on the effect that the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Dickerson v. United States134 will have on courts’
ability to make exceptions to the Miranda doctrine and concludes that
Miranda remains flexible and prophylactic—albeit constitutionally
based—after Dickerson. Consequentially, courts have the authority to
carve an exception to the Miranda doctrine in the international
context if appropriate.
A. Miranda: Inflexible Textual Mandate or Flexible Prophylactic
Rule?
To determine whether exceptions and modifications to Miranda
can be made in the international arena, it is first necessary to
determine whether Miranda is a constitutional mandate or a
constitutional prophylactic rule that can be modified to fit new
scenarios not envisioned by the Miranda decision itself. Before
turning to the merits of this issue, it is necessary to define some terms
that will be used in the remainder of this Article. A “constitutional
mandate,” as the phrase is used in the Article, means an
interpretation by the Supreme Court that a provision of the Bill of
Rights invariably requires a particular outcome. For example, the
notion that no law can be upheld which criminalizes a peaceful
statement of one’s political views on a public street corner is derived
from the constitutional mandate in the First Amendment that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”135
Similarly, the rule that the government cannot force a defendant to
134. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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testify at his own criminal trial is a constitutional mandate of the text
of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.
On occasion, however, the Supreme Court has encountered
difficulty in enforcing certain provisions of the Bill of Rights or has
found enforcement measures taken by other branches of the federal
government and by the states to be lacking. As a result, the Court has
created what have become commonly referred to as prophylactic
rules. A prophylactic rule has been defined as a “preventive
measure . . . to safeguard against a potential constitutional violation”
that “does not announce a requirement mandated by the underlying
constitutional provision, but a requirement adopted in the Court’s
exercise of its authority to draft remedies and procedures that
facilitate its adjudicatory responsibility.”136 To adequately protect the
underlying right, a prophylactic rule will usually “sweep more
broadly” than required by the Constitution’s text. In some cases, the
prophylactic rule will require that evidence be suppressed when no
actual constitutional violation occurred.137 The Supreme Court views
this drawback as a necessary trade-off for a clear rule that protects
the underlying constitutional right better than does mere reliance on
the strict interpretation of the text.138
A perfect example of a judicially created prophylactic rule is the
Miranda doctrine. Nowhere in the Bill of Rights does it say that a
suspect must be advised of his right to remain silent or of his right to
an attorney prior to custodial interrogation. In 1966, rather, the
Supreme Court believed that the due process voluntariness test was
largely ineffective because it was too difficult, after the fact, to
reconstruct the totality of the circumstances surrounding an
136. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.9(e), at 672–73 (2d ed. 1999)
(citations omitted). Professor Susan Klein defines a prophylactic rule as a “judicially-created
doctrinal rule or legal requirement” that is appropriate for determining “whether an explicit or
‘true’ federal constitutional rule is applicable. It may be triggered by less than a showing that the
explicit rule was violated, but provides approximately the same result as a showing that the
explicit rule was violated.” Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules,
Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1030, 1032 (2001). Another scholar, Professor Brian Landsberg, refers to such rules as “risk-
avoidance rules that are not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are
adopted to ensure that the government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules.”
Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic
Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999).
137. See Klein, supra note 136, at 1033 (noting that “a prophylactic rule will prohibit some
governmental behavior that would otherwise be declared constitutional”).
138. See id. at 1037 (explaining that the Court uses bright line rules to guide officials making
“snap judgments” without legal training).
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interrogation to determine if a confession was voluntary.139 In
addition, the voluntariness test was somewhat vague and provided
little guidance to police, and the police violated the rule time and
time again.140 Seeing the rule violated repeatedly, and recognizing that
Congress and the states had never implemented any law enforcement
rules or procedures to protect against involuntary confessions, the
Court was compelled to create a new system that was effective and
provided clear guidance to police officers.141 As a result, the Court
switched the focus of pretrial confession law from a due process
analysis back to the privilege against self-incrimination, which had
been dormant since not long after the Bram decision in 1897, and
created the now-famous warnings/waiver procedure.142 Although the
text of the Fifth Amendment does not state that “warnings” are
required, the Miranda Court judicially created the warnings/waiver
mechanism to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court believed that requiring the universal administration of Miranda
warnings would lessen the coercion inherent in custodial
interrogations, consequently ensuring that suspects would not confess
involuntarily.143 Under Miranda, unwarned confessions are
inadmissible regardless of whether they were made “involuntarily” in
the traditional sense of that term. Thus, Miranda is a judicially
created procedure, not mandated by the text of the Constitution,
which is designed to protect an underlying constitutional right. As
such, it is a quintessential prophylactic rule.144
B. The Exceptions to Miranda Demonstrate Its Prophylactic Nature
The Supreme Court has created several exceptions to the
Miranda doctrine. This observation alone demonstrates Miranda’s
prophylactic nature because, by definition, the Court cannot fashion
exceptions to a constitutional mandate. In addition, in carving these
139. Donald Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda,
and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9–16 (2001)
(describing the Supreme Court’s dissatisfaction with the voluntariness test and its deliberate
efforts to find the right set of cases with which to impose an alternative standard).
140. See id. at 9–10 (explaining the consequences of the voluntariness standard’s vagueness).
141. See id. at 9–14 (noting that the Court sought a means to regulate police on a wholesale
basis).
142. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–65 (1966).
143. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
144. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 136, at 676 (stating that Miranda has come to be
“viewed as paradigmatic of prophylactic” procedural rules).
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Miranda exceptions, the Supreme Court has expressly labeled
Miranda as a prophylactic tool created by the Court to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination.
In the 1984 case of New York v. Quarles,145 for example, a young
woman approached two police officers on the street and told them
that she had been raped by a man who had just entered a nearby
grocery store.146 She provided the officers with a detailed description
of the man and informed them that he was carrying a gun.147 The
officers entered the grocery store with guns drawn and found a man
who matched the description that the victim provided.148 Upon
frisking him, the officers discovered that the suspect was wearing a
gun holster and that the holster was empty.149 Without administering
Miranda warnings, an officer asked the suspect where the gun was
and the suspect nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and
answered, “the gun is over there.”150 The suspect was placed under
arrest and later charged with criminal possession of a weapon.151
At trial, the prosecution attempted to admit into evidence the
statement “the gun is over there.”152 The trial court and the New York
Court of Appeals both agreed that this statement had to be
suppressed because it was provided in response to a “custodial
interrogation” without Miranda warnings,153 and the prosecution
appealed. The United States Supreme Court’s decision initially
observed that Miranda warnings were a “practical reinforcement”—a
“prophylactic” mechanism designed to protect the privilege against
self-incrimination.154 A failure to follow the precise guidelines of
Miranda, therefore, did not necessarily amount to a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. In the case at hand, the
incriminating statement had been made voluntarily and not as a result
of any undue coercion or force by the police. 155 Thus, even though the
officers had not advised the suspect of his Miranda rights, the
145. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
146. Id. at 651–52.
147. Id. at 652.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 652–53.
153. Id. at 653.
154. Id. at 654.
155. Id. at 654–55.
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underlying constitutional policy embodied in the privilege against
self-incrimination had not necessarily been frustrated.
Having acknowledged Miranda’s prophylactic nature, the
Quarles Court then recognized that the Miranda doctrine is based
upon a balancing test.156 On one side of the scale is the public’s need
to obtain confessions to ensure that criminal perpetrators can be
prosecuted effectively; on the other side of the scale is the need to
protect the civil liberties embodied in the privilege against self-
incrimination.157 In the typical situation contemplated by the Miranda
court—where a suspect is interrogated in a custodial setting such as a
police station—the benefits that the warnings provide in ensuring that
constitutional rights are enforced outweigh the burden to the
government and the public in having some reliable confessions
suppressed from evidence and some guilty individuals decline to
confess when they otherwise might have. This was the basic balance
that the Miranda Court originally struck in crafting its prophylactic
156. Id. at 657–58. For discussion of the Fifth Amendment’s balancing test, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 971 (1987) (noting
Fifth Amendment cases in which balancing was applied); Steven Andrew Drizin, Note, Will the
Public Safety Exception Swallow the Miranda Exclusionary Rule?, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 692, 701–02 (1984) (recounting the use of balancing by the Court); William J.
Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 842 n.11 (1989) (noting the
use of balancing in weighing the rights of suspects versus the interests of law enforcement).
157. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657–58; see also Drizin, supra note 156, at 701–02 (discussing the
Court’s balancing in Quarles).
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rule.158 The Quarles Court acknowledged, however, that not all
situations fit within the typical scenario envisioned by the Miranda
Court. Law enforcement officers face “kaleidoscopic situation[s]”
where “spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is
necessarily the order of the day.”159
In Quarles, the public and the police had an additional concern
weighing in on its side of the balance—the overriding need to secure
the gun as quickly as possible. An accomplice, or even a customer,
could have stumbled upon the gun in the grocery store and caused
injury to himself or others. Administering Miranda warnings in this
situation could have caused the suspect to invoke his right to remain
silent, which would have delayed locating the gun and increased the
danger to the public. Thus, because the safety of the public was at
risk, the balance shifted toward the public’s side of the scale and
outweighed the protection of civil liberties afforded by Miranda’s
prophylactic warnings. In Quarles, the Court used the Miranda
balancing test to create a “public safety” exception to the Miranda
doctrine.160
Based on the rationale that Miranda is not a “constitutional
mandate,” the Supreme Court has carved out three additional
exceptions to the doctrine in the last three decades. In Michigan v.
158. Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority and
Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 407 (2001) (discussing the fact that in
the Miranda decision the Supreme Court balanced law enforcement interests against civil
liberties in crafting its prophylactic rule); Dripps, supra note 139, at 19–22 (same). The Supreme
Court has described the delicate balance it struck in Miranda as follows:
Custodial interrogations implicate two competing concerns. On the one hand, “the
need for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws”
cannot be doubted. Admissions of guilt are more than merely “desirable,” they are
essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those
who violate the law. On the other hand, the Court has recognized that the
interrogation process is “inherently coercive” and that, as a consequence, there exists
a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between
legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible compulsion.
Miranda attempted to reconcile these opposing concerns by giving the defendant the
power to exert some control over the course of the interrogation. Declining to adopt
the more extreme position that the actual presence of a lawyer was necessary to
dispel the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation, the Court found that the
suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less intrusive
means. Police questioning, often an essential part of the investigatory process, could
continue in its traditional form, the Court held, but only if the suspect clearly
understood that, at any time, he could bring the proceeding to a halt or, short of that,
call in an attorney to give advice and monitor the conduct of his interrogators.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426–27 (1986) (citations omitted).
159. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656.
160. For a more detailed discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Quarles, see
generally Drizin, supra note 156.
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Tucker,161 the prosecution introduced witness testimony that
incriminated the defendant. The prosecution discovered the testifying
witness’s identity, however, by questioning the defendant without
administering Miranda warnings.162 After recognizing that the
Miranda warnings were prophylactic rules created to “provide
practical reinforcement”163 for the privilege against self-incrimination,
the Supreme Court ruled that the “fruits” of a Miranda violation (in
Tucker, the testimony of the witness whose identity was obtained
from the defendant in violation of Miranda) could be used against a
defendant without running afoul of the privilege against self-
incrimination as long as the defendant’s statement that revealed the
“fruits” was made voluntarily.164 The rationale espoused by the Court
for not suppressing the fruits of a Miranda violation was that because
a defendant’s own statements taken in violation of Miranda must
always be suppressed, the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule
is adequately served at that point.165
Based on similar reasoning, the Court ruled in Harris v. New
York166 that the government may impeach a defendant who testifies at
trial with his own statements taken in violation of Miranda.167 The
Court ruled that excluding such statements from the government’s
case-in-chief was sufficient to deter future Miranda violations because
the police cannot know at the time of an interrogation if there will be
a trial or if the defendant will opt to testify at trial.168 And in Oregon v.
Elstad,169 the Court ruled that an initial confession obtained in
violation of Miranda did not taint a subsequent confession obtained
from the same defendant after Miranda warnings had been properly
administered.170 The Court stated that the Miranda doctrine “sweeps
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself,”171 and this
161. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
162. Id. at 437.
163. Id. at 444.
164. Id. at 444–45.
165. The Court stated that “[w]hatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the
exclusion of [the defendant’s own] statements may had had, we do not believe it would be
significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of the witness . . . as well.” Id. at 448.
166. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
167. Id. at 225–26.
168. Id. at 225; see Dripps, supra note 139, at 26–28 (explaining how the Court circumscribed
the Miranda exclusionary rule).
169. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
170. Id. at 318.
171. Id. at 306.
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statement—reinforced by the judicial creation of a public safety
exception, a fruits of the statement exception, and a subsequent
confession exception—reveals Miranda’s prophylactic nature.
C. Miranda Is A Constitutional Prophylactic Rule: Dickerson v.
United States
Two years after Miranda was decided, Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. § 3501.172 This statute was intended to overrule Miranda by
once again making voluntariness, rather than the recitation of
warnings, the touchstone for the admissibility of confessions.173
Section 3501 set forth a nonexclusive list of factors (including whether
the suspect was advised of his constitutional rights) that courts could
consider in determining voluntariness.174 Although this statute was
enacted in 1968, federal prosecutors had largely ignored it, and thus
Miranda remained the law of the land simply by default.175
172. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)).
173. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436 (2000) (“[W]e agree with the Court of
Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda.”).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994):
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the
trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to
voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it
shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant
evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight
to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant
making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2)
whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or
of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not
such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement
and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such
defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel
when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession.
175. See Brooke B. Grona, Case Note, United States v. Dickerson: Leaving Miranda and
Finding a Deserted Statute, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 367 (1999) (discussing the fact that § 3501
had not been invoked by prosecutors prior to Dickerson); see also United States v. Dickerson,
166 F.3d 667, 671–72 (4th Cir. 1999) (raising the issue of § 3501’s application and stating that
“the Department of Justice cannot prevent us from deciding this case under the governing law
simply by refusing to argue it”), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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In the 2000 case of Dickerson v. United States,176 however, the
long-awaited confrontation between Miranda and § 3501 finally
emerged. The Dickerson defendant was charged with bank robbery
and other offenses.177 Prior to trial, he moved to suppress certain
statements made to FBI agents on the ground that he had not
received Miranda warnings before being interrogated.178 After the
district court granted the motion, the prosecution took an
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.179
The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the district court
had failed to consider whether the confession was admissible
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3501 despite the lack of Miranda warnings.180
The court of appeals concluded that § 3501 was valid because
Congress has the authority to overrule Miranda given that Miranda
handed down a mere prophylactic rule rather than a constitutional
mandate.181
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and noted that it may use
its supervisory authority over the federal courts to prescribe “rules of
evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals.”182 The
power to judicially create such nonconstitutional rules, however,
“exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.”183 Congress
retains “the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially
created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the
Constitution.”184 On the other hand, when the Supreme Court
establishes a rule that interprets or applies the Constitution, Congress
may not legislatively supersede such a decision.185 The question in
Dickerson, therefore, was “whether the Miranda Court announced a
constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to
regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction.”186 If
Miranda announced a constitutional rule, it could not be overruled by
176. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
177. Id. at 432.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
181. Id. at 672.
182. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437 (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996)).
183. Id. (quoting Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959)).
184. Id. (citing Palermo, 360 U.S. at 345–48; Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 426; and Vance v. Terrazas,
444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980)).
185. Id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517–21 (1997)).
186. Id.
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statute and § 3501 was unconstitutional; if the Miranda decision were
merely a judicially created rule of evidence or procedure, Congress
had the authority to overrule that decision by enacting § 3501.
As a preliminary matter, the Court observed that language in
several of its Miranda decisions suggests that Miranda was merely a
judicially created rule of evidence without constitutional
foundation.187 Despite such language, the Court held that § 3501 could
not be enforced because Miranda was in fact intended to be a
constitutional ruling.188 This holding was based in part upon the fact
that the Court previously had applied the Miranda rule to
proceedings in state courts.189 Because the Supreme Court may
impose constitutional mandates upon state courts but does not hold
supervisory power over them, the Court’s prior rulings applying
Miranda to the states were tantamount to a holding that Miranda is a
constitutional ruling.190
In contrast, the court of appeals had held that Miranda was not a
constitutional decision because the Supreme Court has not always
enforced the Miranda doctrine when the circumstances have rendered
its application impractical.191 The court of appeals apparently believed
that Supreme Court decisions that create prophylactic rules are
nonconstitutional in the sense that they are similar to common law
rules of evidence that may be modified or overruled by an act of
Congress. Only decisions that hand down “constitutional mandates”
are within the Court’s authority to interpret the Constitution, and
only these decisions are immune to being overruled by Congress.
187. Id. at 438 n.2 (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1994); Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1993) (“Miranda’s safeguards are not constitutional in
character.”); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S.
523, 528 (1987) (“[T]he Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the
exercise of Fifth Amendment rights.”); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that Miranda
“imposed a general prophylactic rule that is not manifestly required by anything in the text of
the Constitution.”)).
188. Id. at 438.
189. Id. at 438–39. The Dickerson Court also was persuaded that Miranda is based in the
Constitution because of language in the decision suggesting that it was derived from the
Constitution, id. at 439–40, and because previous decisions of the Court had allowed prisoners
to bring habeas corpus actions in federal court alleging Miranda violations. Id. at 439 n.3.
190. Id. at 438–39.
191. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 689–90 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that the
Court has declined to exclude statements taken in violation of Miranda when used for the
purposes of impeachment, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), or taken under emergency
circumstances, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)).
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Citing Quarles v. New York192 and Harris v. New York,193 the Supreme
Court responded in Dickerson:
These decisions illustrate the principle—not that Miranda is not a
constitutional rule—but that no constitutional rule is immutable. No
court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various
circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of
modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part
of constitutional law as the original decision.194
Although the Supreme Court has yet to clarify its decision in
Dickerson, several scholars have commented that, in light of
Dickerson, Miranda and its exceptions have become “frozen in
time.”195 In holding that Congress does not have the authority to
overrule Miranda, Dickerson must stand for the proposition that
Miranda essentially is an inflexible constitutional mandate. Because
the Dickerson Court refused to overrule Quarles and the other
Miranda exceptions, and because the Court simultaneously held that
Miranda is constitutionally based, a proponent of the frozen-in-time
interpretation would believe that the decision is inconsistent and
“cannot be characterized as plausible.”196 Accordingly, Dickerson, in
“an apparent compromise between the right and left wings of the
Court,” created a doctrine that does not make sense and that “holds
by judicial fiat that the law is to stay exactly as it was pre-
Dickerson.”197 A scholar or court that subscribes to this interpretation
of Dickerson would apparently believe that no additional exceptions
could be made to the Miranda doctrine.
This view of Dickerson, however, is not the only—or necessarily
the best—interpretation. A second view would hold that when the
Supreme Court interprets provisions in the Bill of Rights, it has the
implicit constitutional power to create flexible prophylactic rules, and,
192. See supra notes 145–160 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
194. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
195. Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . ., 99 MICH. L.
REV. 879, 894 (2001); see also Dripps, supra note 139, at 35 (observing that Dickerson
maintained a status quo that was “regarded by virtually every informed observer as inconsistent
and unprincipled”); Klein, supra note 136, at 1071 (commenting that Dickerson keeps the law
“exactly as it was pre-Dickerson”).
196. Kamisar, supra note 158, at 394 (quoting from a draft version of Klein, supra note 136);
see also Klein, supra note 136, at 1071 (concluding that Dickerson is contradictory and
incoherent).
197. Klein, supra note 136, at 1071.
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when necessary, to enforce those provisions.198 These prophylactic
rules are not simply common law rules of evidence or procedure; they
are constitutional rulings in the sense that they stem from the Court’s
interpretation of what is required to give adequate meaning to the
Bill of Rights.199 As one commentator has noted, “prophylactic is not
the opposite of constitutional.”200 When Congress overrules such a
prophylactic rule, it erases a procedure that the Supreme Court has
deemed necessary to protect the Constitution and undermines a
constitutional right. Accordingly, an act of Congress that purports to
overrule a constitutionally based prophylactic rule, without providing
a substitute procedure that is equally effective in protecting the
underlying constitutional right, is unconstitutional and cannot be
enforced.
This is not a novel theory. Indeed, as the government set forth in
its briefs to the Court in Dickerson, the Court in several other
contexts has already adopted this idea.201 In Anders v. California,202 for
example, the Court created a constitutional prophylactic rule to
protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during an appeal.203
The Court also created a procedure for appellate counsel to use when
counsel wishes to withdraw from the representation of an indigent
defendant based on the conclusion that the defendant’s appeal is
meritless.204 The Anders rule requires appellate counsel to file a brief
with the appellate court stating that there are no nonfrivolous issues
for appeal and to cite any place in the trial record that might support
198. Professors Kamisar and Klein, who suggest that the result of Dickerson will be that
Miranda jurisprudence is now frozen in time, write that creating and enforcing prophylactic
rules is a legitimate power of the Supreme Court. Kamisar, supra note 158, at 426–28; Klein,
supra note 136, at 1051. For a discussion of the different interpretations that may be made of
Miranda after Dickerson, see George C. Thomas III, Separated At Birth But Siblings
Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1090–91
(2001).
199. See Kamisar, supra note 158, at 426 (“Indeed, if anything, there is a stronger
relationship between the Miranda doctrine and the explicit text of the Constitution than there is
between the voluntariness rule and the constitutional text.”); Klein, supra note 136, at 1037–
1044 (listing a number of constitutional prophylactic rules and their corresponding clauses).
200. Paul Cassell & Robert Litt, Will Miranda Survive?: Dickerson v. United States: The
Right to Remain Silent, the Supreme Court, and Congress, Debate at the Georgetown
University Law Center (Mar. 28, 2000), in 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (2000).
201. See Brief for the United States at 44–47, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000) (No. 99-5525) (expounding the constitutional nature of Miranda).
202. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
203. Id. at 744–45.
204. Id.
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an appeal.205 The Court has explained that the Anders procedure is
“not ‘an independent constitutional command’” but a “‘prophylactic
framework’ . . . established to vindicate the constitutional right to
appellate counsel.”206 The Court recently reaffirmed in Smith v.
Robbins207 that the Constitution mandates that appellate counsel must
adhere to a prophylactic procedure to protect the defendant’s right to
appellate counsel.208 Indeed, the Smith Court explained that the states
are free to adopt procedures to replace the Anders framework, but
such procedures must be equally effective in protecting the right to
counsel or they are unconstitutional.209 Thus, the Anders procedure is
an example of a rule that is simultaneously prophylactic and
constitutional.
In Michigan v. Jackson,210 the Court ruled that after a defendant
has invoked his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment at an
arraignment or analogous proceeding, “any waiver of the defendant’s
right to counsel for . . . police-initiated interrogation is invalid.”211 But
subsequently, in Michigan v. Harvey,212 the Court held that a
confession obtained in violation of the Jackson rule may be used for
impeachment purposes despite the fact that it may not be used in the
government’s case-in-chief.213 The Court grounded this distinction on
the fact that the rule in Jackson was a “prophylactic rule”214 “not
compelled directly by the Constitution”215 that was designed “to
ensure voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.”216
In Bruton v. United States,217 the Court created yet another
constitutional prophylactic rule that sweeps broader than the
Constitution to protect the defendant’s rights under the
205. Id.
206. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.
551, 555 (1987)).
207. 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
208. Id. at 276–77.
209. Id. at 276.
210. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
211. Id. at 636.
212. 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
213. Id. at 345–46.
214. Id. at 345, 346, 349, 351, 353.
215. Id. at 351–52 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 351.
217. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.218 In Bruton, the
Court ruled that in joint trials, a confession by a nontestifying
codefendant that incriminates his codefendant cannot be admitted.219
The purpose of the rule was to avoid the risk that the jury would
ignore a limiting instruction and convict the nonconfessing defendant
based upon his codefendant’s confessions.220 The Court reasoned that
although some juries might be able to adhere to the limiting
instruction, the Confrontation Clause protects the nonconfessing
defendant from the risk that they would not.221 In a later case,
Tennessee v. Street,222 the Court balanced the competing interests
underlying this prophylactic rule and held that a statement that is
inadmissible under Bruton is nevertheless admissible for purposes of
impeachment.223
In North Carolina v. Pearce,224 the Court created a prophylactic
rule, framed as a presumption of vindictiveness, that requires a judge
to articulate the basis for increasing a defendant’s sentence after a
successful appeal and reconviction.225 The Court later expressly
labeled this rule as prophylactic and noted that although the Pearce
presumption may favor the defendant in instances when the
sentencing judge has not acted vindictively, such a rule was required
to provide meaning to an important constitutional right.226
Anders, Jackson, Bruton, and Pearce created rules that are not
only prophylactic; they are also constitutional in the sense that they
set a constitutional floor insofar as any proposed legislative substitute
218. See id. at 135–37 (discussing the scope of the rule announced).
219. Id. at 126.
220. Id. at 135–36.
221. Id. at 136–37.
222. 471 U.S. 409 (1985).
223. Id. at 417.
224. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
225. Id. at 726.
226. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (interpreting Pearce as “ensur[ing]
that the apprehension of . . . vindictiveness does not ‘deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to
appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction’” (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725)). In addition,
in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court created a constitutional
prophylactic rule in the First Amendment context. In providing First Amendment protection to
some defamatory false statements that have no constitutional value, the Court explained that
false speech must be protected to some degree to avoid a chilling effect on valuable speech. Id.
at 269–72. This rule is prophylactic in the sense that nothing in the text of the First Amendment
requires the protection of false speech, and thus the rule “goes beyond” the dictates of the First
Amendment to provide adequate protection for that important right.
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must satisfy this constitutional minimum. As the government
expressed in its Dickerson brief:
Prophylactic rules are now and have been for many years a feature
of this Court’s constitutional adjudication. Miranda is distinctive in
the detail with which the Court specified particular procedural
safeguards. But Miranda’s adoption of a prophylactic rule—which
has been applied where necessary but not, as Tucker, Quarles, and
Elstad show, in categories of cases where its adverse effects would
outweigh any benefits—does not uniquely depart from the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence.227
In specifically discussing the Miranda exceptions, the government
argued that
[a]s those cases highlight, the Court’s description of the Miranda
rules as “prophylactic” does not mean that the rules are therefore
extra-constitutional. As the Court stated in Withrow: “‘prophylactic’
though it may be, in protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards ‘a
fundamental trial right.’”228
227. Brief for the United States, supra note 201, at 47.
228. Id. at 25 (emphasis omitted in original) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court’s
practice of creating prophylactic rules that are constitutional in nature has sometimes been
called “constitutional common law,” based on a seminal article by Henry P. Monaghan. See
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1975) (explaining
how constitutional doctrines subject to amendment, modification, or reversal by Congress fall
under the outline of an “inspired” common law rooted in the Constitution). Professor Kamisar
eloquently synthesizes the rationale in support of this theory:
[T]here is nothing inappropriate or illegitimate about prophylactic rules generally or
the Miranda warnings in particular. . . .
. . . .
“The characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule that ‘goes beyond’ the
Constitution seems to be a way of saying that Miranda represents [a] kind of
deliberate choice to exclude some voluntary confessions, in exchange for the benefits
of identifying or deterring some compelled confessions that would otherwise escape
detection.” The Miranda rules do “go beyond” the Constitution “in the sense that
[they] reflect not just the values protected by the Fifth Amendment, but institutional
concerns about the most effective way to secure those values.” However, “[v]irtually
all of the constitutional law” does.
At times, prophylactic rules are “necessary to combat a substantial potential for
constitutional violations.” Such rules “are based on the Constitution because they are
predicated on a judicial judgment that the risk of a constitutional violation is
sufficiently great that simply case-by-case enforcement of the core right is insufficient
to secure that right.”
At times, as demonstrated by cases like Miranda and Pearce, the two rulings that
have “come to be viewed as paradigmatic of prophylactic decisionmaking,” the power
to fashion prophylactic rules is the power to make constitutional guarantees more
GODSEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/24/02  3:52 PM
1750 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1703
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dickerson has been strongly
criticized by scholars because it failed to explicitly state whether
Miranda is a prophylactic constitutional rule or an inflexible,
constitutional mandate.229 And because the Court did not specify
which theory it was adopting, either interpretation is certainly
defensible. When future courts interpret Dickerson, they must choose
between two interpretations: one that makes the decision internally
inconsistent and implausible and one that allows the decision to make
sense. Interpreting Dickerson to mean that Miranda jurisprudence is
now inflexible and “frozen in time”230 because it is a constitutional
mandate renders the decision implausible in light of the Court’s
simultaneous refusal to overturn its prior Miranda exceptions.231 And
certainly nothing in the Dickerson opinion can be read as ruling out
the interpretation that Miranda remains a flexible, prophylactic
rule—the Court’s statement regarding Miranda that no constitutional
meaningful and more effective. This power is inherent in the art of constitutional
interpretation—indeed, in the art of judging.
Kamisar, supra note 158, at 426–28 (citations omitted).
229. See Dripps, supra note 139, at 72 (criticizing the majority’s acquiescence to Dickerson’s
“legitimacy deficit”); Kamisar, supra note 195, at 895–96 (summarizing criticisms of Dickerson
by various scholars); Klein, supra note 136, at 1071 (“This opinion was, in a word, terrible.”).
Justice Scalia used his dissenting opinion in Dickerson to attack the government’s theory that
the Court has the authority to create constitutional prophylactic rules that cannot be abrogated
by Congress. Based on his view that this practice usurps Congress’s constitutionally delegated
power to legislate, Scalia called it a “lawless” and “anti-democratic power” that “does not
exist.” United States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 446, 457 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia challenged the government’s claim regarding the extent to which the Court has previously
subscribed to this theory. Id. at 457–60. He argued that, for example, the holdings of Bruton,
Anders, and New York Times did not create constitutional prophylactic rules, but rather
constituted the Court’s interpretation of constitutional mandates. Id. at 457–59. In an article
responding to Scalia’s dissent, Professor Kamisar persuasively undermines Scalia’s
interpretation of these cases, and makes a compelling case that these decisions did in fact create
constitutional prophylactic rules. Kamisar, supra note 158, at 411–24; see also Klein, supra note
136, at 1037–44 (describing why many of these cases actually created constitutional prophylactic
rules). For the purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to determine exactly how many times
in the past the Court has created constitutional prophylactic rules. That issue is being hotly
debated in the scholarly literature and, as the disagreement between Scalia and Kamisar
illustrates, because much of this debate turns on semantics and subjective interpretations, a
definitive answer would be difficult to achieve. The point is that even Justice Scalia admitted in
his dissent that the practice has been approved in at least one case—North Carolina v. Pearce.
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 459–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court later explicitly
acknowledged Pearce’s prophylactic character.”) And although Scalia vehemently disagrees
with the validity of this practice, Pearce demonstrates that, even by Scalia’s standards, the
government was on solid ground in terms of precedent in presenting this theory to the Court.
230. Kamisar, supra note 158, at 397.
231. See id. at 394 (agreeing that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s compromise opinion in
Dickerson reaches an implausible holding by “judicial fiat”).
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rule is immutable seems to support this view.232 Furthermore, the
Court expressed that “[n]o court laying down a general rule can
possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek
to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases
[the Miranda exceptions] are as much a normal part of constitutional
law as the original decision.”233 This unambiguous embrace of the
Miranda exceptions, which together established the pre-Dickerson
view that Miranda was flexible, strongly undermines the notion that
the Court in Dickerson intended Miranda to suddenly become
“frozen in time.”234
The actual holding of Dickerson is also instructive. The Court
held § 3501 unconstitutional not because it replaced Miranda with an
alternative scheme, but because it failed to offer a substitute
framework that would protect the privilege against self-incrimination
as effectively as the Miranda warnings.235 Thus, Dickerson reaffirmed
the principle set forth in Miranda that the four warnings are not
necessarily a constitutional mandate; rather, the mandate is that the
privilege against self-incrimination requires something beyond the
voluntariness test that is at least as effective as the warnings. Because
§ 3501 did not offer protections above and beyond the voluntariness
test, it was unconstitutional.236 This holding leaves open the possibility
that equally effective legislative procedures may be created to replace
Miranda and satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. This
holding further suggests that Miranda established a prophylactic rule
232. Id. at 398.
233. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
234. Of course, trying to guess what the Supreme Court will do in the future is like reading
tea leaves, and the Court could simply label this language in Dickerson dicta, overrule the
Miranda exception cases, and hold that Miranda is a per se mandate of the Fifth Amendment.
The fact that the Court refused to do this in Dickerson at the risk of making its opinion less
clear on its face, however, suggests that the Court is not inclined to adopt this approach.
235. Id. at 440–42.
236. Id.
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that has not been frozen in time.237
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, recognized that the majority’s
opinion is open to two interpretations. Scalia acknowledged that the
first interpretation—that Miranda is now an inflexible constitutional
mandate—does not “make sense.”238 And although he applauded the
majority for not openly adopting the constitutional prophylactic rule
theory that he so detests, he recognized that, in the end, “logic will
out.”239 Scalia believed that Dickerson will come to be known as the
case that establishes Miranda as a doctrine that is both
constitutionally based and prophylactic at the same time.240 And
though the debate about the legitimacy of constitutional prophylactic
rules is unlikely to subside anytime soon,241 Justice Scalia correctly
concluded that the best interpretation of Dickerson is that Miranda
remains a flexible—yet constitutionally based—prophylactic rule.
D. The Application of Miranda to Non-Americans Abroad
The preceding analysis of the Miranda doctrine provides a
framework for addressing the ultimate issue presented in this Article:
the application of Miranda to non-Americans abroad. When
pondering the future of Miranda’s flexibility, it is helpful to imagine
how the rigid “constitutional mandate” view of Miranda would unfold
in the international context. Imagine an FBI agent, conducting an
investigation abroad, who seeks to interrogate a suspect in custody
who has committed a series of crimes against the United States. The
agent hopes ultimately to charge the suspect and, with the permission
of the host country, bring him to the United States to stand trial. If
the host country does not recognize the right to counsel during an
initial interrogation, an inflexible interpretation of Miranda would
237. Furthermore, by examining the language of the Miranda decision and many of the
subsequent decisions that have hinted at the constitutional nature of the doctrine, the Dickerson
opinion suggested not that the Supreme Court intended to change its prior Miranda
jurisprudence in light of some newfound constitutional basis for that doctrine, but rather that its
prior Miranda rulings—including Quarles and the balancing test—have been constitutionally
based all along. The Court’s observations that Miranda was “a constitutional decision of this
Court,” id. at 432, has a “constitutional basis,” id. at 439 n.3, is a “constitutional rule,” id. at 439,
and has “constitutional underpinnings,” id. at 440 n.5, are also instructive. Terms such as
“underpinnings” and “basis” seem to suggest a rule that is not directly mandated by the text of
the Fifth Amendment, but one that, like a prophylactic rule, is one step further removed.
238. Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 461 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. See supra notes 228–229, 234.
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require the FBI agent to mislead the suspect by informing him that he
has the right to counsel during the interrogation. Because most courts
would not condone this troubling result, some modification to
Miranda in this context appears inevitable.242 Part V critiques the Bin
242. In considering whether the Supreme Court will adhere to a “frozen in time” view of
Miranda, it might also be helpful to imagine if the Supreme Court were asked to confront the
tricky issue of whether Miranda applies to conversations between prisoners and prison guards.
This issue was expressly addressed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1985). The defendant in Conley, a prison inmate, was
suspected of killing another inmate. Id. at 971. When prison guards found evidence connecting
him to the murder, the defendant was handcuffed and questioned in a prison “control center”
and later in the prison infirmary. Id. The defendant proceeded to make statements about the
incident that were later used against him at his murder trial. Id. at 972. The defendant
contended at trial and on appeal that the statements should have been suppressed because he
had been interrogated in custody without Miranda warnings. Id. The court of appeals
recognized that the defendant technically should have been given the warnings if Miranda were
interpreted literally. Id. As a prisoner who was not free to leave his immediate environment, the
defendant was in “custody” in the same sense of the word as the custodial interrogation that the
Miranda decision envisioned, in which a suspect is taken off the street and interrogated in a
police station interrogation room. Id. To apply the same general Miranda definition of
“custody” in all contexts, however, would “torture” the Miranda doctrine because it would
“seriously disrupt prison administration by requiring, as a prudential measure, formal warnings
prior to many of the myriad informal conversations between inmates and prison guards which
may touch on past or future criminal activity and which may yield potentially incriminating
statements useful at trial.” Id. at 973. Acknowledging that it was making a “pragmatic”
modification to Miranda’s custody analysis, the court held that “[p]risoner interrogation simply
does not lend itself easily to analysis under the traditional formulations of the Miranda rule.” Id.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit ruled that Miranda warnings were not required before the
defendant was questioned. Id. at 974. For a more detailed discussion of Conley and the
application of Miranda to the prison context, see generally Steve Finizio, Prison Cells, Leg
Restraints, and “Custodial Interrogation”: Miranda’s Role in Crimes That Occur in Prison, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 719, 920 (1992) (tracing the evolution of the Miranda doctrine as it relates to
prisoners and observing that while some of those cases reached the correct result, the proper
inquiry is “whether the institution has turned its coercive powers against the individual
inmate”); Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for
Incarcerated Suspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1997) (arguing that prisoners should be determined
to be in “Miranda custody” only when restraint additional to that normally encountered in
prison is imposed).
On three different occasions the Supreme Court has declined to review cases raising this
issue. See Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U.S. 1011 (1990) (denying certiorari to application of the prison
exception by the Ohio Supreme Court); Conley v. United States, 479 U.S. 830 (1986) (denying
certiorari to a case creating a prison exception on appeal from the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 404 U.S. 809 (1971) (denying
certiorari to a case involving certification of the prison exception issue to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals). In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court held
Miranda applicable to an interview of a prison inmate by an IRS agent. Id. at 5. The Supreme
Court seemed to accept a per se “in custody” approach for prisoners in that case. Mathis can be
distinguished from Conley, however, because Mathis was interrogated by a federal agent, not a
prison guard, and thus the difficulty of applying Miranda to conversations between prisoners
and prison guards recognized by the court of appeals in Conley was not present in Mathis. See
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Laden court’s rigid approach to this dilemma, and Part VI proposes a
new Miranda framework for the international arena.
Before turning to the Bin Laden court, though, it is important to
succinctly set forth three lessons from the prior discussion that will be
applied in this analysis. First, Miranda should be interpreted as a
flexible, prophylactic rule. Second, because the Miranda rule is
prophylactic, it is governed by a balancing test. To determine
Miranda’s applicability in factual scenarios of first impression, a court
must weigh the costs to the police and society in enforcing the rule
against the protection of civil liberties that is provided by the
application of the rule. This balancing test was the basis of the
Miranda decision and was further reflected in Quarles.243 Third,
Miranda’s applicability is intimately intertwined with the deterrent
rationale behind the exclusionary rule. As illustrated in Tucker and
Harris,244 when an application of the Miranda exclusionary rule would
not adequately further the policy of deterrence, an exception to the
doctrine may be made.
V.  CRITIQUING THE BIN LADEN COURT: MIRANDA IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA
In ruling on the extraterritorial application of Miranda to non-
Americans abroad, the Bin Laden court was essentially writing on a
clean slate.245 The court framed the issue and its holding as follows:
Assume for purposes of this discussion these generalized facts: An
individual held in the custody of foreign police is suspected of
having violated both local and U.S. criminal law. As a matter of
global comity, U.S. law enforcement representatives are permitted
inside the foreign stationhouse to pose their own questions to the
Finizio, supra at 725 (“Lower courts have limited Mathis to its facts: Mathis was questioned by a
government agent who was not a member of the prison staff about a matter not under
investigation within the prison itself.”). If the Supreme Court were to address the issue in
Conley, it is hard to imagine that it would stick to an inflexible, “constitutional mandate” view
of Miranda and hold that the warnings must be administered before each time a prison guard
asks a question of a prisoner that is “reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.” See
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (setting forth a test for interrogation under the
Miranda standard). To do so would, as the court of appeals pointed out, result in a difficult
scenario in which prison guards would be required to Mirandize inmates before virtually every
conversation they have with them.
243. See supra notes 145–160 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 161-168 and accompanying text.
245. See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing
that the court faced an issue of first impression).
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suspect. U.S. agents eventually succeed in extracting inculpatory
statements, and the suspect is thereafter transported to the United
States for prosecution, with the consent of foreign authorities. By
what standards should a domestic court admit the above statements
as governmental evidence at trial? We believe that a principled, but
realistic application of Miranda’s familiar warning/waiver
framework, in the absence of a constitutionally-adequate
alternative, is both necessary and appropriate under the Fifth
Amendment.246
The court then addressed the type of Miranda warnings that are
required. Without expressly addressing the issues of Miranda’s
flexibility (or lack thereof) after Dickerson, the court acknowledged
that a strict requirement that United States law enforcement officials
abroad must administer the four domestic Miranda warnings would
not be feasible in light of the different rights afforded by the United
States and foreign countries.247 Thus, the court set out to determine
what warnings should be administered in all future interrogations
taking place outside of the United States.
The court divided its analysis into two parts: the right to remain
silent and the right to counsel. Regarding the right to remain silent, a
non-American suspect “must be told that he has the right to remain
silent, effective even if he has already spoken to the foreign
authorities. He must also be told that anything he does say may be
used against him in a court in the United States or elsewhere.”248 The
court called this requirement “uncontroversial.”249 In connection with
the right to counsel, the court imposed two requirements: first, the
suspect must be advised what his right to counsel would be if he were
located in the United States, and second, American law enforcement
officials must be “clear and candid as to both the existence of the
right to counsel [in the foreign nation] and the possible impediments
to its exercise.”250 In this respect, the court stated:
The goal is to convey to a suspect that, with respect to any
questioning by U.S. agents, his ability to exercise his right to the
presence and assistance of counsel—a right ordinarily unqualified—
hinges on two external considerations arising from the fact of his
246. Id. at 185–86.
247. Id. at 187–89.
248. Id. at 187–88.
249. Id. at 188.
250. Id.
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foreign custody. First, since there exists no institutional mechanism
for the international provision of an American court-appointed
lawyer, the availability of public counsel overseas turns chiefly on
foreign law. Second, foreign law may also ban all manner of defense
counsel from even entering the foreign stationhouse, and such law
necessarily trumps American procedure. Given these eventualities,
U.S. law enforcement can only do the best they can to give full effect
to a suspect’s right to the presence and assistance of counsel, while
still respecting the ultimate authority of the foreign sovereign. And
if an attorney, whether appointed or retained, is truly and absolutely
unavailable, and that result remains unsatisfactory to the suspect, he
should be told that he need not speak to the Americans so long as he
is without legal representation. Moreover, even if the suspect opts to
speak without a lawyer present, he should know that he still has the
right to stop answering questions at any time.251
The court then offered the following sample right to counsel
warnings, to supplement the right to remain silent warning, which it
deemed necessary to satisfy the dictates of Miranda:
Under U.S. law, you have the right to talk to a lawyer to get advice
before we ask you any questions and you can have a lawyer with you
during questioning. Were we in the United States, if you could not
afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you wished,
before any questioning.
Because you are not in our custody and we are not in the United
States, we cannot ensure that you will be permitted access to a
lawyer, or have one appointed for you, before or during any
questioning.
However, if you want a lawyer, we will ask the foreign authorities to
permit access to a lawyer or to appoint one for you. If the foreign
authorities agree, then you can talk to that lawyer to get advice
before we ask you any questions and you can have that lawyer with
you during questioning.
If you want a lawyer, but the foreign authorities do not permit
access at this time to a lawyer or will not now appoint one for you,
then you still have the right not to speak with us at any time without
a lawyer present.252
251. Id. at 188–89.
252. Id. at 188 n.16.
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Although the Bin Laden court did not set forth its requirements
in numeric order, the holding can be crystallized into four basic
warnings that must be administered to a non-American suspect in the
international context:
Warning One: You have the right to remain silent and
anything that you say may be used against you in court. 253
Warning Two: If you were in the United States, you
would have an absolute right to counsel before and
during any questioning.254
Warning Three: Because you are not in the United
States, your right to an attorney depends upon foreign
law, but the United States government will do its best to
help you obtain retained or appointed counsel if you so
desire by making that request of the foreign hosts.255
Warning Four: If the foreign authorities will not provide
you with a lawyer, you do not have to speak to U.S.
authorities, and if you do choose to speak without an
attorney, you may stop at any time.256
The modified Miranda warnings that were administered to Al-
’Owhali were deemed insufficient because, under Warning Three,
they did not inform him that the United States would make an
attempt to obtain counsel for him if he so desired.257 The Bin Laden
court held that the modified Miranda warnings were insufficient
because they “prematurely foreclose[d] the significant possibility that
the foreign authorities themselves [would have], if asked, either
suppl[ied] counsel at public expense or permit[ted] retained counsel
inside the stationhouse.”258
It is important to note that the Bin Laden court was not
suggesting the best or fairest manner in which American law
enforcement officials abroad should advise alien suspects prior to
custodial interrogation. Instead, the court set forth what it deemed to
be the absolute minimum requirements for custodial interrogations
253. See id. at 187–88.
254. See id. at 188.
255. See id. at 188–89.
256. See id. at 189.
257. Id. at 191–92.
258. Id. at 190.
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abroad. Falling short of these minimum requirements would render
any subsequent confession inadmissible at trial in the United States.259
It is difficult to understand, however, how Warning Two (which
requires that FBI agents advise the suspect of what his right to
counsel would be if he were in the United States) sufficiently
advances the privilege against self-incrimination such that the failure
to administer it would dictate the application of the exclusionary rule
pursuant to the Miranda balancing test. The Miranda warnings were
designed to counteract the inherently coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogation. By advising a suspect of his rights, the police
alleviate some of the compulsion associated with custodial
questioning and provide an atmosphere in which a suspect could
knowingly and freely invoke those rights if he so desires.260 In the
Miranda balancing test, therefore, advising a suspect of his actual
rights that he presently enjoys and may invoke at will adds significant
weight to the civil liberties side of the scale because it injects those
rights into the forefront of the suspect’s mind in a way that he can
understand and use to his benefit. This procedure demonstrates to the
suspect that his civil liberties are not simply obscure promises in the
text of the Constitution, thus lessening the coercive atmosphere of the
interrogation. But advising a suspect hypothetically of what his rights
would be in a different country—rights that he is simultaneously
informed have no bearing on his current situation—can hardly have
such an effect.261 Indeed, such a warning would enhance the coercive
atmosphere by reinforcing that the suspect’s fate is ultimately in the
hands of the laws of a host country that does not honor civil liberties
as does the United States.
Warning Three, which requires that FBI agents advise suspects
that their right to counsel depends upon the decision of the foreign
259. Id. at 189.
260. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
261. An argument that this rule would further Miranda’s policies because it would allow the
suspect to demand that he be extradited to the United States, where he could obtain counsel, is
unrealistic. Such an extradition would often require extensive negotiations between the United
States and the host nation (assuming there is an extradition treaty between the two nations),
and in many cases, the host country simply would not consent to the extradition. In many other
cases, the time required to complete the extradition would hinder the law enforcement purposes
of the interrogation. Implicitly recognizing this problem, the Bin Laden court assumed that
suspects would remain in the custody of the host nation and did not argue that this warning was
justified on the basis of a possible extradition. In addition, extradition would not be possible if
formal charges have not been brought against the suspect in the United States, a situation that
would be common in the pretrial interrogation stage.
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country, presents a similar problem. In the United States, informing a
suspect of his right to counsel protects the privilege against self-
incrimination and adds weight to the civil liberties side of the scale.262
When the right to counsel is guaranteed, informing a suspect of that
right dissipates the coercive atmosphere because it informs the
suspect that he has an ally—a champion for his rights—if he wants
one. The implicit theory of the Miranda Court was that even if a
suspect does not invoke his right to counsel, the unequivocal warning
gives the suspect an “ace in the hole” to play at will and changes the
dynamics in a way that empowers the suspect and decreases the
likelihood that he will feel compelled to incriminate himself. And
when a suspect invokes this right, the coercive nature of the interview
is dissipated almost completely by the presence of counsel. In
contrast, when the right to counsel is conditional upon the agreement
of the host country, the impact of this warning loses its force. Indeed,
advising a suspect of a speculative right to counsel that is afforded
only if the suspect’s captors agree would hardly have the coercion-
dissipating effect of a warning that is absolute, easy to understand,
and that can be triggered without complication. In addition, some
non-Americans abroad, to whom such notions of constitutional rights
might seem counterintuitive or even fanciful and whose suspicions of
the American government and/or the host country might run high,
would likely take this noncommittal statement with a grain of salt.
The following hypothetical demonstrates a more serious problem
with Warning Three. A suspect in Nation X commits an offense that
is prosecutable under the laws of both the United States and Nation
X (as in the Bin Laden case). An FBI agent located in Nation X fails
to follow the holding of Bin Laden; he does not advise the suspect
that his right to counsel depends upon the law of Nation X and thus
cannot be guaranteed, nor does he inform the suspect that the United
States will try to arrange counsel for him through the host nation if he
desires. The suspect proceeds to make a voluntary confession that
does not infringe the constitutional right that Miranda was designed
to protect—the privilege against self-incrimination. At trial in the
United States, the suspect moves to suppress his confession due to a
lack of Warning Three pursuant to Bin Laden. Suspects in Nation X
do not have the right to counsel until they have been indicted, and the
suspect had not been indicted at the time of the interrogation. At
trial, the government submits an affidavit from the head law
262. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
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enforcement representative of Nation X stating that if the FBI agent
in question had asked his agency to provide an attorney for the
suspect, his agency would have declined the request pursuant to local
law and custom. Under Bin Laden, the confession in this case would
be suppressed even though the suspect would not have obtained an
attorney even if the FBI agent had advised the suspect of his
speculative right to counsel under the law of Nation X and the suspect
had, as a result, requested an attorney. The Bin Laden rule would
require the suppression of the confession to promote a hypothetical
right that actually does not exist, and thus, cannot be protected
through the application of the exclusionary rule.
Certainly there would be many instances in which the host
country would agree to supply counsel to the suspect during an
interrogation, and Miranda’s goal of protecting civil liberties would
be furthered.263 But the percentage of scenarios in which counsel
would actually be afforded by the host nation upon request could not
be determined with accuracy, and would be in an ongoing state of flux
given the continual changes in governments and regimes in nations
around the world. In the United States, a suspect always has the
opportunity to consult with counsel during an interrogation, and as a
consequence, the civil liberties side of the scale holds the maximum
possible weight. Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that in
50 percent of foreign countries the right to counsel during an initial
interrogation is not guaranteed, then the global application of the Bin
Laden rule would result in the civil liberties side of the Miranda
balancing scale carrying only half of the weight in the international
context than it did when the Miranda Court evaluated the
prophylactic warning procedure in the domestic context. Thus, the
Bin Laden court’s analysis exacts a heavy toll on our society by
suppressing probative confessions to support a prophylactic
mechanism that is less effective than it is in the United States for
suspects who do not invoke their right to counsel and completely
ineffective in many situations for those who do request to speak to an
attorney.
263. The goal of protecting civil liberties, however, would only be furthered for those
suspects who invoked their right to counsel. Miranda’s coercion-dissipating policy would still
not be substantially furthered in relation to those suspects who did not invoke counsel and
confessed after hearing about their noncommittal “right” to counsel depending on what the host
nation decides.
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The Nation X scenario also provides a helpful framework for
analyzing Warning Four, which requires law enforcement to inform a
suspect that he does not have to speak to American representatives at
all if an attorney is ultimately not provided by the host nation.264
Assume that the suspect provides a voluntary confession without
having received Warning Four and a United States court excludes his
confession pursuant to the analysis set forth in Bin Laden. Once
again, application of the exclusionary rule would result in a detriment
to society while purporting to protect a civil right that does not exist
and therefore cannot be protected. After being placed on notice
through this litigation that Nation X will never provide attorneys to
suspects prior to the indictment stage, the FBI agent would have no
choice but to inform the next suspect he interrogates in Nation X that
the suspect has no right to an attorney and may refuse to speak to any
representative from the United States. This procedure would allow
non-American suspects to “freeze out” the United States from
interrogations in that country. A suspect would simply have to invoke
his right to an attorney, and because the FBI agent could not provide
counsel under the law of Nation X, the FBI would be forced to back
out of the interrogation under the Bin Laden rule.265 As a result,
Nation X would probably take over both the interrogation and the
prosecution, and the suspect would not be provided with an attorney
and might be subjected to civil rights abuses that far exceed a mere
failure to administer Miranda warnings. By refusing to allow Miranda
to be modified to reflect the realities of global law enforcement, the
Bin Laden court created a Miranda balancing scale for the
international context that not only carries less weight on the civil
liberties side of the balance than in the United States but may also
actually undermine the civil liberties it purports to protect.
264. This warning is the foundation from which Warnings Two and Three derive. Indeed,
Warnings Two and Three stem from the Bin Laden court’s fundamental belief that the right to
have an attorney present during interrogation invariably applies regardless of foreign law, as
these two warnings make sense only as context and background to the final statement of the
ultimate right to counsel embodied in Warning Four.
265. Of course, when a suspect invokes his right to counsel in the United States, law
enforcement officers are not “frozen out” of the interrogation; they must simply provide the
suspect with the opportunity to obtain counsel before continuing. But in Nation X, the
interrogation could not continue under any circumstances because counsel would not be
available. In addition, in the United States when a suspect obtains counsel and then declines to
continue the interview, the civil liberties side of the Miranda balancing scale is enhanced as a
trade-off because a constitutional right has been exercised and protected as a result. But a
corresponding benefit could never be achieved in Nation X.
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At the same time, the Bin Laden court’s ruling places an even
heavier burden on the “public detriment” side of the scale than exists
in the domestic setting. Indeed, not only are voluntary and reliable
confessions suppressed from evidence (which is the bulk of the weight
that this side of the scale carries domestically266), but in addition, the
United States is hampered with a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
other nations in its ability to investigate international crime. Most
notably, and somewhat ironically, if the foreign nation were to take
over the interrogation because of this “freeze out” effect and the
suspect were still ultimately tried in the United States, the suspect’s
confession would be admissible despite the lack of any Miranda
warnings because the federal courts have universally held that foreign
police do not have to Mirandize suspects—even when those suspects
are later tried in the United States.267 Thus, the FBI under Bin Laden
would be frozen out of the interrogation each time a suspect invoked
his right to counsel and would be placed at a competitive
disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign law enforcement. The suspect then
either will be tried abroad, where protections for civil liberties may be
scant or nonexistent, or tried in the United States, where Miranda
warning would not be required anyway under the “foreign police”
exception to Miranda. The absurdity of this framework speaks for
itself.
If this absurd framework resulted from an inflexible
constitutional mandate, it certainly could not be modified; the Bill of
Rights cannot be discarded when it causes inconvenience or hardship.
But Miranda should be read after Dickerson as a flexible,
prophylactic rule that can be modified—or even temporarily
discarded—in new situations in which its application is illogical or in
which the balancing test suggests that the rule would be
inappropriate. Under Bin Laden, society endures the hardships
described above and their costs to civil liberties to promote a
prophylactic rule that does not effectively protect—and may actually
undermine—the underlying constitutional right that it was designed
to protect.268 This result tortures the balancing test established by
266. The Miranda warnings may also cause some suspects to decline to voluntarily confess
where they otherwise might have.
267. See supra notes 15, 64; infra note 321.
268. Although the Dickerson Court held that Miranda was constitutionally based, it cannot
be considered an absolute “right” in the sense that exceptions to the doctrine can be made. See
supra Part IV.B.
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Miranda and its progeny.269 It is important to remember that this
analysis focuses on the applicability of a prophylactic rule, not the
underlying constitutional right. In the international context, the
privilege against self-incrimination would protect the suspect at all
times, and if the underlying constitutional right were violated
(because the amount of FBI coercion put on the subject resulted in a
“compelled” confession), any statements obtained as a result would
be inadmissible at trial in the United States.270
Finally, consider Warning One, which requires law enforcement
officials to inform non-American suspects that they have the right to
remain silent. In creating this warning, the Bin Laden court
apparently did not envision countries such as China that do not offer
suspects this right.271 Consider the following hypothetical, based
loosely on the Bin Laden facts. Members of a rogue terrorist group
have bombed the United States embassy in China, murdering
numerous Americans and Chinese. FBI agents arrive in China to
investigate and learn that Chinese authorities have taken into custody
a potential suspect in the bombing. Chinese authorities grant the FBI
access to the suspect for an interview. The lead FBI agent introduces
himself to the suspect and, without Mirandizing the suspect, says, “I
think you know why we are here. Do you have anything to tell us
about the bombing?” The suspect, who hopes to cut a good deal by
cooperating with authorities, proceeds to admit his participation in
the terrorist attack and provides the FBI with details concerning the
participation of his co-conspirators. Later, the suspect is brought to
trial in the United States and, while admitting that his confession was
made voluntarily and without any coercion, moves to suppress the
confession that he made in China on the sole ground that he was not
269. Id.
270. It is not clear which of the two rules—the “compelled confession” rule of the privilege
against self-incrimination or the “involuntary confession” rule of the Due Process Clause—
would apply in this context, as the Supreme Court has been less than clear on the distinction
between these rules even in the domestic setting. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
271. Under Article 93 of the People’s Republic of China’s criminal procedure law, suspects
not only have no right to remain silent, but are obliged to answer questions which are “relevant”
to the investigation. THE AMENDED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND THE CRIMINAL COURT
RULES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 77 (Wei Luo trans., 2000) (“A criminal suspect
shall truthfully answer the questions raised by an investigative functionary based on facts, but he
has the right to refuse to answer the questions which are not relevant to the case.”); see also
Hilary K. Josephs, The Upright and Low-Down: An Examination of Official Corruption in the
United States and the People’s Republic of China, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 269, 272
(2000) (noting that China does not recognize a corollary to the American privilege against self-
incrimination).
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read his Miranda rights under Bin Laden before he was questioned.
The application of Miranda’s exclusionary rule in such a situation,
however, would again be tantamount to protecting a civil liberty that
does not exist and thus cannot be protected.
Furthermore, application of the exclusionary rule in such a
scenario would result in the same “freeze out” from future
interrogations in that country. Now knowing that China does not
afford suspects the right to remain silent or the right to counsel during
an interrogation,272 a recitation of the Bin Laden warnings would be
misleading. Thus, no warnings could be given in good faith to
suspects. Certainly it would be less coercive to say nothing at the start
of such an interrogation than to inform a suspect of the truth: that he
has no right to remain silent and cannot obtain a lawyer. But because
an FBI agent would be forced to Mirandize a suspect under Bin
Laden, the agent would have to back out of the investigation. The
United States would be forced to allow Chinese authorities to handle
all future interrogations in that country—even when serious
American interests are at stake—and abuses far worse than a
Miranda violation might occur. Indeed, Chinese authorities would be
permitted under Chinese law to forcibly extract a confession from the
suspect without a lawyer present.273 And if Chinese authorities
conducted the interrogation and the suspect were later tried in the
United States, his confession would be admissible despite the lack of
Miranda warnings as long as it was voluntarily made. Again, not only
would such a result add further weight to the “public detriment” side
of the Miranda balancing scale because it would hinder the ability of
the United States to redress serious national injuries abroad, but it
also would not further the broader goals of protecting civil liberties.274
272. A right to counsel in China does not attach until after the first time the suspect has been
questioned. There is no requirement that police inform a suspect of his right to counsel. See
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO REFORM? AN ANALYSIS OF
CHINA’S REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 39–40 (1996); see also Josephs, supra note 271,
at 272 n.13 (discussing the limited right to counsel in China).
273. See Josephs, supra note 271, at 272 n.13 (describing the limited rights of criminal
suspects under Chinese law).
274. It obviously would be difficult to obtain a voluntary confession in China if the suspect
were aware during the interview that China does not recognize the right to remain silent. If the
FBI were preparing to interview such a suspect, it would be wise for its agents to inform the
suspect that he is not required to speak to the FBI. This would be done as a matter of good
practice to increase the likelihood that any confession that followed later would be viewed as
voluntary by an American court. What the FBI should do as a matter of strategy and good
practice, however, is different than requiring the practice as a matter of law. Because
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As the Supreme Court suggested in Tucker,275 Elstad,276 and
Harris,277 Miranda’s applicability to new situations is determined not
only through a balancing test but also by analyzing the facts of a case
in light of the purpose of the exclusionary rule. As the Supreme Court
expressed in Tucker:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing
to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of the
accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good
faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.278
In the China scenario, the FBI agents cannot improve the suspect’s
situation by misleading him with the administration of nonexistent
Miranda rights. They could not have provided him with counsel, and
therefore they could not have taken “a greater degree of care” in
protecting the suspect’s rights. The FBI agents in the China scenario
did nothing wrong by failing to advise the suspect of his Miranda
rights, and the agents are prohibited by the realities of foreign law
from changing their conduct in the future even after being penalized
by the exclusionary rule. Clearly, the application of the exclusionary
suppressing a voluntary confession in China due to a lack of Miranda warnings would not serve
any purpose, such warnings should not be imposed upon the FBI by a court.
275. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
276. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
277. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
278. 417 U.S. at 447. The Tucker Court also stated:
Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair
one, it cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make
no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law enforcement and the vagaries of human
nature would make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error,
therefore, we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose. 
We have recently said, in a search-and-seizure context, that the exclusionary rule’s
“prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
We then continued: “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to
deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” In a proper case this
rationale would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment context as well.
Id. at 446–47 (citations omitted). But see Martin R. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith
Exception to the Miranda Rule—A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 468–75 (1984) (discussing the
policies behind the exclusionary rule and the “good faith” exception to the rule, and arguing
that the courts should not extend the good faith exception in the Fifth Amendment context).
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rule can never effectively protect a right that does not exist in the
country where an interrogation takes place.
Finally, the Supreme Court has viewed the Miranda rule
favorably in domestic cases because it is easy for police officers to
apply. A law enforcement officer in the United States must merely
recite the warnings from memory, taking just a few seconds to satisfy
his constitutional mandate. The Quarles Court noted that Miranda
remains a “workable rule” primarily based upon the assumption that
it is easy for police officers to implement.279 Of paramount importance
in the evolution of Miranda is to maintain a framework “to guide
police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.”280 In creating the public safety
exception, the Court declined
to place [police] officers . . . in the untenable position of having to
consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society
for them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda
warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover
inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve
the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly
damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and
neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.281
But the rule created by the Bin Laden court drastically deviates
from this simplicity, thus undermining the effectiveness of the
Miranda rule in the international context. Although the court stated
that FBI agents must “ask” local officials if they will provide counsel
for the suspect, this task would hardly be so simple. One can easily
imagine scenarios in which this request would proceed up the
hierarchical chain of law enforcement within the host country and
would quickly unfold into a complicated negotiation between the host
nation and the United States. Rather than calling the Bin Laden rule
one that requires the administration of “warnings” to a suspect, it
could more accurately be characterized as a rule that requires FBI
agents to make an offer to a suspect to begin complicated
negotiations on his behalf with the host nation as to what rights he
will receive.
279. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984).
280. Id. (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979)).
281. Id. at 657–58.
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The court also rather naively assumed that the FBI and the law
enforcement agency from the host nation would be on good terms
with one another, and thus, cooperation between the two would be
the norm. Anyone who has worked in federal law enforcement can
verify, however, that when two sovereigns are thrown into a case
together (including, for example, federal and state entities in the
domestic context), a lack of mutual cooperation is not uncommon. It
is easy to imagine situations in which law enforcement representatives
from the host nation would be hostile to the presence of the FBI in
their country (from their point of view, the FBI might be trying to
take over their investigation and prosecution), and thus would look
askance at any such request from the United States. In many cases
abroad, FBI agents would be guests of the host country and often
would have been forced to negotiate in the first instance simply to
secure the opportunity to speak to the suspect. To expect the FBI to
make sensitive requests of the host nation as soon as its agents arrive
on the scene does not recognize the delicate realities of law
enforcement in the international arena.
After advising a suspect of his speculative rights under foreign
law, the Bin Laden rule requires officers to make a “detailed inquiry”
into the law of that nation and engage in negotiation with local
officials in an effort to mimic the rights that would have been
provided were the interrogation conducted in the United States.282 To
recreate an American interrogation, the Bin Laden holding places
American law enforcement officers in an untenable position; FBI
agents must maneuver through the complexities of foreign law and
become temporary diplomats with the sensitive responsibility of
negotiating international human rights with the host country. Such a
situation has never been required by Miranda and its progeny, and
the Supreme Court made clear in Berkemer v. McCarty283 that the
evolving Miranda rule must be crafted in a way to avoid placing law
282. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 188 (2001).
283. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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enforcement officers in such complicated scenarios.284
In the United States, application of Miranda is a simple
endeavor. An officer must merely recite from memory the standard
warnings that never change as the officer’s geographic location varies.
But requiring law enforcement officers abroad to successfully
navigate the laws of every foreign country in which they may find
themselves, and then negotiate with foreign officials to determine
what additional rights can be afforded, would likewise create an
“elaborate set of rules, interlaced with exceptions and subtle
284. In Berkemer, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s urgings to carve out an
exception to Miranda for misdemeanor arrests, stating:
One of the principal advantages of the doctrine that suspects must be given
warnings before being interrogated while in custody is the clarity of that rule.
“Miranda’s holding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with
specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of
informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such
interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which benefits the accused
and the State alike, has been thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in
Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the
suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence even though the confession
might be voluntary under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis.”
The exception to Miranda proposed by [the government] would substantially
undermine this crucial advantage of the doctrine. The police often are unaware when
they arrest a person whether he may have committed a misdemeanor or a felony.
Consider, for example, the reasonably common situation in which the driver of a car
involved in an accident is taken into custody. Under Ohio law, both driving while
under the influence of intoxicants and negligent vehicular homicide are
misdemeanors, while reckless vehicular homicide is a felony. When arresting a person
for causing a collision, the police may not know which of these offenses he may have
committed. Indeed, the nature of his offense may depend upon circumstances
unknowable to the police, such as whether the suspect has previously committed a
similar offense or has a criminal record of some other kind. It may even turn upon
events yet to happen, such as whether a victim of the accident dies. It would be
unreasonable to expect the police to make guesses as to the nature of the criminal
conduct at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect.
Equally importantly, the doctrinal complexities that would confront the courts if
we accepted [the government’s] proposal would be Byzantine. Difficult questions
quickly spring to mind: For instance, investigations into seemingly minor offenses
sometimes escalate gradually into investigations into more serious matters; at what
point in the evolution of an affair of this sort would the police be obliged to give
Miranda warnings to a suspect in custody? What evidence would be necessary to
establish that an arrest for a misdemeanor offense was merely a pretext to enable the
police to interrogate the suspect (in hopes of obtaining information about a felony)
without providing him the safeguards prescribed by Miranda? The litigation
necessary to resolve such matters would be time-consuming and disruptive of law
enforcement. And the end result would be an elaborate set of rules, interlaced with
exceptions and subtle distinctions, discriminating between different kinds of custodial
interrogations. Neither the police nor criminal defendants would benefit from such a
development.
Absent a compelling justification we surely would be unwilling so seriously to
impair the simplicity and clarity of the holding of Miranda.
Id. at 430–32 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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distinctions,”285 that varied from country to country, and would result
in the same type of unwieldy and confusing framework that the
Supreme Court so strongly discouraged in Berkemer and Quarles.286
The Bin Laden court’s failure was that it imposed its
requirements based upon the premise that “the great wisdom of
Miranda” is that law enforcement must “do what it can at the start of
interrogation to dissipate the taint of compulsion.”287 This is not
entirely correct. Miranda was not designed to be a one-sided doctrine
that requires the police to do everything they possibly can to
counteract any compulsion that a suspect might feel. As many
scholars have pointed out, Miranda was a compromise opinion that
rejected this one-sided approach.288 The Court easily could have taken
a stronger civil liberties stance and required, as urged by the
American Civil Liberties Union,289 that an interrogation cannot take
place unless defense counsel is present in the interrogation room.
Instead, Miranda attempted to craft a delicate balance between the
needs of law enforcement and the constitutional rights of suspects.290
The Bin Laden court, however, utterly failed to analyze its holding in
light of the Miranda balancing test and the purposes behind the
exclusionary rule—both of which are intimately intertwined with
Miranda’s applicability to new situations.
285. Id. at 432.
286. See supra notes 279–280, 283–284, and accompanying text. For a discussion of the need
for bright-line rules in criminal procedure, and particularly Miranda, see Charles D.
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 162–67 (1998) (discussing the
continuing need for bright-line rules in criminal procedure and the clear guidance that Miranda
provides to law enforcement officials and judges ).
287. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 187.
288. See Dripps, supra note 139, at 19–22 (noting that the waiver doctrine’s inconsistency
with the rest of the Miranda opinion can only be explained as the Court’s “concern for effective
law enforcement”); Kamisar, supra note 158, at 407–08 (discussing the balance drawn by Justice
O’Connor between the needs of law enforcement and the protections afforded to the suspect
from “impermissible coercion”).
289. See Dripps, supra note 139, at 20 (noting that the Miranda opinion partially tracked the
ACLU’s brief, but rejected the argument that the presence of counsel is required to protect the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Kamisar, supra note 158, at 395
(“Miranda rejected ‘the more extreme position’ advocated by the ACLU that nothing less than
‘the actual presence of a lawyer’ . . . was needed to dispel the compelling pressure inherent in
custodial interrogation.”) (quoting Justice O’Connor in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426
(1986)).
290. See supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text.
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VI.  MIRANDA’S FINAL FRONTIER: A NEW FRAMEWORK
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
The foregoing analysis is not intended to imply that FBI agents
abroad should be free to trample upon the civil liberties of non-
Americans abroad. Because the Miranda prophylactic rule exists to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination, it can be modified in
new situations in which it fails to perform the functions for which it
was intended. But the privilege against self-incrimination, which is
inflexible and applies to anyone tried in the United States regardless
of nationality, must always be satisfied.291 Thus, the privilege
invariably protects non-Americans during American interrogations
abroad, and, as a result, any confession that an FBI agent obtains
from such a suspect that is “compelled” and/or “involuntary” would
be inadmissible.292 Although this Article has identified problems with
the Bin Laden court’s expansive extraterritorial application of
Miranda, some of the court’s analysis would be useful in determining
the voluntariness of a confession. For example, if a suspect abroad
independently were to request counsel during an interrogation, even
though he was located in a country that does not recognize that right
and therefore was not advised of such a right at the outset of the
291. See supra notes 43–63 and accompanying text.
292. And/or is used in this sentence because it is not clear which of these two doctrines
would apply in an international scenario in which Miranda is inapplicable. See Bin Laden, 132 F.
Supp. 2d at 194 n.26 (demonstrating the court’s uncertainty as to which standard—the privilege
against self-incrimination or the due process “voluntariness” test—is appropriate). Even after
holding in 1964 that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states, the Supreme
Court has continued to use the Due Process Clause rather than the privilege to exclude
involuntary confessions. See supra note 61. Whether or not the “voluntariness” test of the Due
Process Clause applies to an interrogation of a non-American beyond the borders of the United
States, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article has concluded, however, that
the privilege does apply to such an interrogation. But as a result of its reliance on notions of due
process, the Court has not fully developed the legal standard by which the privilege would
exclude a problematic confession in a situation where Miranda is inapplicable. Professor Joseph
Grano argues that the test pursuant to the privilege should be “voluntariness,” and should
therefore be identical to the due process test. See Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the
Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confession Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 687–
88 (1986) (comparing Fifth Amendment compulsion to pre- and post-Miranda decisions).
Professor Lawrence Herman argues, on the other hand, that the test under the privilege should
be whether the confession was “compelled.” See Herman, supra note 61, at 524–28, 552 (arguing
that the “compelled” test under the Fifth Amendment leaves less ambiguity than the
“involuntary” due process test). This test, according to Professor Herman, is more protective of
a suspect’s rights than is the due process “voluntariness” test, as it focuses solely on the pressure
applied by the police rather than the “totality of the circumstances.” See id. at 501–04 (focusing
on “an abstract assessment of the power or force of the sanction imposed on silence”).
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interrogation, an FBI agent would have to tread lightly or risk
rendering any subsequent confession “compelled” or “involuntary.”293
The question addressed by the Bin Laden court and this Article,
however, is not the myriad situations that could arise when Miranda
warnings are not administered and a suspect independently attempts
to invoke certain rights, but rather what warnings must be given to an
alien suspect at the outset of a foreign interrogation.
A. The Required Warnings
The balancing test and exclusionary rule policy that revealed that
the analysis of the Bin Laden court was skewed also suggest that FBI
agents abroad should not be entirely free of dictates of Miranda. In
situations in which an FBI agent is aware, or can discover through
reasonable efforts under the exigencies of the circumstances, that the
host country offers certain rights embodied in Miranda, there is no
logical reason under Miranda why the suspect in question should not
be advised of those rights. For example, if an FBI agent were to
conduct an interrogation in Germany and had knowledge that
suspects in Germany have the right to remain silent during
interrogations,294 any confession he obtained from the suspect should
be suppressed if the agent did not advise the suspect of that right. In
nations in which the right to remain silent and/or the right to counsel
during interrogation are recognized, applying the exclusionary rule
when United States law enforcement agents willfully or negligently
293. The law is, at best, unclear whether a confession would be deemed inadmissible if a
suspect’s request for counsel were denied in situations in which Miranda does not apply. The
Supreme Court has stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches after the time
that judicial proceedings have been initiated against a suspect, “whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). Thus, under Brewer, a
suspect would not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a stationhouse interrogation
if he has not yet been formally charged with a crime. And because the Miranda decision ruled
that the right to counsel during police interrogations was based upon the privilege against self-
incrimination rather than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 469–70 (1966), this modified right to counsel arguably would not be triggered in
interrogations in which Miranda was deemed inapplicable. Thus, the most likely result would be
that the denial of a request for counsel in situations in which the Miranda warnings are not
required would be seen as one factor in determining whether the subsequent confession may
have been involuntary or compelled. See supra notes 43–63 and accompanying text; see also
Kamisar, supra note 158, at 389–90 (discussing whether the denial of a request for an attorney
would render a confession inadmissible and stating that the answer is “not perfectly clear”).
294. See Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of
Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799, 808 n.25 (1998) (discussing the right to remain
silent in Germany).
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ignore those rights would protect the suspect’s rights in the same
manner as it does in the United States. Indeed, advising a suspect
abroad of a right that is certain and that he may invoke at will would
lessen the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation, thus furthering
the policies behind Miranda. And because the law enforcement
officers of the host nation would be held to the same requirements,
the United States would not be placed at competitive disadvantage in
redressing its national injuries by the “freeze out” effect. In such
situations, therefore, the operation of the balancing test would closely
track its operation in the United States.
Questions might arise as to the proper procedure in countries
that recognize a certain right, such as the right to counsel during an
interrogation, but that do not require the local police to advise
suspects of that right. Because such a scenario would create the
identical situation that the Miranda court faced in the domestic
context in 1966, the warnings should be required in such a situation.
One could imagine, however, a situation in which a high-profile
suspect would decline to confess after hearing of his Miranda
warnings from the FBI, prompting the foreign police to become
hostile to the FBI because the foreign police would believe that the
suspect would have confessed had the FBI not interceded and advised
the suspect of his rights. Or one could imagine a situation in which the
host country would agree to allow the FBI to interrogate a suspect in
their country only on the condition that, consistent with local law,
FBI agents do not advise the suspect of his rights. If a foreign nation
attempted to undermine the ability of American law enforcement
officials to interrogate suspects because that nation did not want
suspects to be advised of their rights, American courts should allow
the FBI to proceed without administering Miranda warnings. Indeed,
because the suspect’s confession could be admitted at a trial in the
United States when the foreign police interrogate him without
Miranda warnings, requiring a rule that places the United States at a
disadvantage to the host country imposes certain disadvantages
without offering any countervailing protections.295
In China, for example, where no Miranda-type rights exist during
an initial interrogation,296 no warnings would be required and the only
test for admissibility would be whether the confession was
“compelled” in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination,
295. See supra notes 15, 64 and accompanying text; infra note 321 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 272–273 and accompanying text.
GODSEY IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/24/02  3:52 PM
2002] MIRANDA’S FINAL FRONTIER 1773
and/or involuntary in violation of the due process “voluntariness”
test.297 In the vast majority of countries that recognize the right to
remain silent,298 however, FBI agents should be required, at a
minimum, to advise suspects of that right. Where the right to counsel
during interrogation is respected, FBI agents should be required to
advise a suspect of that right as well.
B. The Effort That Should Be Required of American Investigators
Abroad to Determine the Rights Available to a Suspect: The Good
Faith Exception
The question remains as to what effort should be required of an
FBI agent to discover what rights are recognized in a foreign country
before he decides which, if any, Miranda-type warnings should be
administered to a non-American abroad. Based on the fact that the
exclusionary rule was designed primarily to deter law enforcement
officers from acting in bad faith or negligently in denying a right to a
suspect, the prosecution in Bin Laden argued that the FBI agents had
done the best they could considering that they were acting with scant
judicial guidance and that they certainly had not willfully or
negligently denied rights to Al-’Owhali.299 From their conversations
with local authorities, FBI agents believed that the right to counsel in
Kenya was not a “right” in the sense that it was left to the discretion
of the Kenyan police.300 The court responded that “[w]hatever the
merits of this [good faith] theory” when foreign Miranda warnings are
administered “after a detailed inquiry into a specific nation’s law,”
such a theory could not provide relief to the prosecution in Bin Laden
because the FBI agents failed to undertake such an inquiry.301 Thus,
the Bin Laden court essentially held that even though the FBI had
responded immediately to a foreign scene where an act of terrorism
had taken place and had a heightened need to speak to Al-’Owhali
immediately to determine if additional acts of terrorism were
forthcoming from his cohorts, the fact that the FBI did not engage in
297. See supra notes 270, 274, and 292.
298. See Van Kessel, supra note 294 at 804 (observing that the right to remain silent is a
common international approach).
299. See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 192 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The
Government additionally argues for some sort of good faith exception to an erroneous [advice
of rights].”).
300. Id. at 190–91.
301. Id. at 192 n.23.
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a detailed legal analysis of the rights available to him in Kenya meant
that the FBI had acted in bad faith or at least negligently.
Interestingly, the Bin Laden court set out in a separate part of its
opinion to interpret the laws of Kenya to determine if Al-’Owhali did
in fact have a right to counsel under the laws of that country during
the interrogation. The court stated:
The Court’s understanding of the law as to Kenya . . . is murky at
best. Kenya’s Constitution imparts: “Every person who is charged
with a criminal offense shall be permitted to defend himself before
the court in person or by a legal representative of his own choice.”
Moreover, “nothing contained in [the aforementioned provision]
shall be construed as entitling a person to legal representation at
public expense.” Yet the Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code
guarantees that “[a] person accused on an offense before a court,
may of right be defended by an advocate.” And the Kenyan Police
Force Standing Orders also ensure: “Every person detained by
police should be given facilities for communicating with a friend or
legal adviser, and such person should be permitted to visit the
prisoner.” We deem it highly inadvisable for the Court to interpret, in
the first instance, how these various provisions play out in practice
within Kenya.302
Thus, the Bin Laden court—which is practiced in interpreting
legal verbiage and has the luxury of law clerks and a law library to
assist in its research—threw up its judicial hands in attempting to
interpret Kenyan law, yet simultaneously held that the FBI agents in
question, presumably without commiserate legal training and under
exigent circumstances, did not sufficiently act in good faith because
they did not parse through the same confusing foreign texts and then
negotiate with the host nation to determine what additional rights
could be afforded to the suspect. Indeed, the analysis of the Bin
Laden court extended the boundaries of the exclusionary rule beyond
the current parameters set by the Supreme Court. Because a suspect’s
constitutional rights in the United States are easy to understand and
never vary, it is easy to see how an officer can be considered to act in
bad faith if he fails to advise a suspect of rights which that officer
already knows of or should know of from his prior experience in his
own country. But because it was designed to deter bad faith and
negligence, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to
require an officer to research the laws of foreign jurisdictions or
302. Id. at 190–91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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otherwise take such affirmative steps to increase the rights available
to a suspect.303
The inability of the Bin Laden court to grapple with the tedious
issues of Kenyan law underscores the fact that the Miranda doctrine
cannot be interpreted to place an unrealistic burden on American law
enforcement abroad. Recall that in Quarles and Berkemer, the
Supreme Court reminded the lower courts that the efficacy of
Miranda depends on its simplicity. The Quarles Court created the
“public safety” exception to Miranda in part because it did not want
to burden law enforcement officers, “who have only limited time and
expertise,” with the task of balancing competing social issues before
deciding whether to Mirandize a suspect.304 Based on the same
rationale, the Berkemer Court refused to adopt a rule that may have
required police officers to perform research and perhaps criminal
background checks on suspects before knowing whether to Mirandize
a suspect.305 The holding of Bin Laden flies in the face of the Supreme
Court’s repeated admonitions that Miranda must remain “simple”
and “practical” for it to remain effective.
This Article proposes, in contrast, that the policies behind
Miranda and its exclusionary rule should require American law
enforcement officers abroad to act in good faith and make a
reasonable effort, under the circumstances, to determine what rights
are available to a suspect. Most FBI agents are not lawyers with
expertise in researching the laws of foreign countries, and under the
exigencies of many international investigations, they cannot be
expected to visit foreign law libraries to perform detailed research
regarding the rights that are available to a suspect in a given country
before they begin a custodial interrogation.
At the same time, however, the policies behind the exclusionary
rule dictate that when an officer willfully or negligently violates a
suspect’s rights, the evidence obtained as a result should be
303. See supra notes 282-286 and accompanying text. In requiring American law
enforcement abroad to negotiate with their foreign hosts in an effort to replicate the rights that
would be available in America, the Bin Laden court created a requirement that American law
enforcement must seek to increase the rights that are available to the suspect under the laws of
the country where he is interrogated. Under Bin Laden, American law enforcement abroad
must make every effort to turn nonrights, in the sense that they are mere hypothetical
possibilities, into actual rights.
304. See supra notes 279–281 and accompanying text.
305.  See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1984) (noting the clarity of the
Miranda doctrine).
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suppressed. In a rapidly unfolding scenario in which the FBI has
responded without notice to the foreign scene of an act of terrorism
and has a pressing need to debrief a suspect immediately to
determine if additional acts of terrorism are imminent, simply asking
foreign law enforcement officials on the scene as to their practices
should be deemed reasonable.
If, on the other hand, no exigencies are present (when a foreign
interrogation is planned by appointment prior to the FBI agent
departing from the United States, for example), more care should be
required. In such cases, it might be negligent for an FBI agent, if time
would have permitted, to fail to consult with the FBI’s legal advisors
or attorneys in the Department of Justice or the Department of State
to try to make an accurate determination of foreign rights. In
addition, if further investigation at the time of trial in the United
States determines that an FBI agent misinterpreted foreign law and
did not advise a suspect of a right to which he was entitled in the
foreign country, a “good faith” exception would bar the use of the
exclusionary rule as long as the officer did not willfully or negligently
make the mistake. The difficulty that the Bin Laden court had in
interpreting Kenyan law demonstrates that good faith mistakes would
not be rare in the global application of Miranda.
The framework proposed in this Article does not offer a bright-
line rule, because such a rule cannot be formulated for the complex
international arena, but this framework is certainly easier for law
enforcement to implement than the Bin Laden rule. In addition, the
touchstone issues at a suppression hearing would be the
“reasonableness” and “good faith” of the law enforcement officers.
Reasonableness and good faith are fundamental legal standards, and
courts have a wealth of experience in evaluating these standards in
areas ranging from torts to criminal law to contract law.306
The analysis presented in this Article was implicitly applied in
two federal cases largely ignored by the Bin Laden court. In United
306. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, Extending the Good Faith Exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule to Warrantless Seizures that Serve as a Basis for the Search
Warrant, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 697 (1995) (describing the good faith standard in criminal
procedure); Agasha Mugasha, Evolving Standards of Conduct (Fiduciary Duty, Good Faith and
Reasonableness) and Commercial Certainty in Multi-Lender Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1789
(2000) (discussing these standards in contract law); George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen,
Failure to Warn in Minnesota, the New Restatement on Products Liability, and the Application of
the Reasonable Care Standard, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 389, 397–407 (1995) (describing the
reasonableness standard in torts).
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States v. Dopf,307 a case before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the defendants were arrested by Mexican authorities, at the
request of an FBI agent, for transporting a stolen car from Texas to
Mexico.308 In Mexico, the FBI agent interviewed each of the
defendants separately.309 Prior to advancing his questions, the agent
advised each defendant that they had a right to remain silent but that
he could not offer them an attorney in Mexico.310 Because the
defendants were American citizens, the agent also offered to contact
the American consulate on their behalf.311 The defendants each
confessed in response to the FBI agent’s questions.312 At trial in the
United States, the defendants moved to suppress their convictions
because they had not been advised of their right to counsel pursuant
to Miranda, but the district court denied their motions.313 Without
significant analysis or discussion, the court of appeals upheld the
district court based upon the rationale provided by the FBI agent at
the suppression hearing:
The waiver of rights form that we use [in the United States] specifies
that they will be furnished with an attorney, that we will provide
them with an attorney, [but] that it makes no provision for the
circumstances we found ourselves in Mexico of having no authority
and not being able to assist them in any other way than to advise the
Consulate.314
The Dopf court approved the deviation from Miranda apparently on
the ground that suspects do not have to be advised of rights that they
do not have in the country in which they are interrogated.
Similarly, in Cranford v. Rodriguez,315 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit faced almost identical facts to those in Dopf. The
court recognized that obtaining a publicly appointed attorney for the
defendant in Mexico was “not possible” and approved a recitation of
rights that did not include the fact that an attorney would be
307. 434 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1970).
308. Id. at 206.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 206–07.
311. Id. at 207.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
315. 512 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1975).
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appointed for the suspect if he could not afford one.316 The Cranford
court stated, “We consider the departure from the Miranda doctrine
that occurred here as a variation which under the facts of this case
was unavoidable and not prejudicial.”317 Admittedly, although these
cases are important in the sense that they both allow deviations from
Miranda abroad, they must be taken lightly because neither offers the
level of analysis expected of such a difficult issue.
The Bin Laden court addressed Dopf and Cranford in a footnote
by noting simply that they are distinguishable because “the courts
seem[ed] to accept as true the blanket assertion that access to counsel
was never possible under the circumstances.”318 This comment
suggests that the Bin Laden court believed that if a right truly is not
available to a suspect abroad, the suspect need not be advised of that
right. This is a plainly unpersuasive attempt to distinguish these cases,
however, as this comment by the Bin Laden court runs directly
contrary to its own detailed analysis in the rest of its opinion. Indeed,
the Bin Laden court’s framework requires law enforcement officers to
research whether or not counsel is available under foreign law, and if
foreign law does not provide for counsel, then they must ask local
authorities to provide for one in any event.319 The Bin Laden court
also held that if counsel is deemed to be absolutely unavailable after
these steps are completed, the suspect must be apprised nonetheless
of this development and told that he is not required to speak to
American law enforcement because of the unavailability of counsel.320
Its holding, therefore, is directly contrary to the holdings in Dopf and
Cranford, which imposed no such requirements in ruling that
deviations from Miranda were permissible abroad.321
316. Id. at 863.
317. Id.
318. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 191 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
319. See id. at 190–91 (criticizing the government’s advice of rights form for neither correctly
informing the suspect of his right to counsel under foreign law nor seeking to preserve the spirit
of Miranda and the paramount right to counsel).
320. Id. at 189.
321. The Bin Laden court supported its holding by citing a line of cases known as the “joint
venture” cases, which all held that Miranda warnings are not required abroad when the
interrogation is conducted by foreign, as opposed to American, law enforcement. Id. at 187
(citing United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 69 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d
594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980); Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Welch, 455
F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Molina-Chacon, 627 F. Supp. 1253, 1262 (E.D.N.Y.
1986); United States v. Hensel, 509 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (D. Me. 1981)). These cases all hold that
Miranda warnings are not required abroad when the interrogation is conducted by foreign—as
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C. Applying the New Framework to the Facts of Bin Laden
If the framework proposed in this Article were applied to the
facts of Bin Laden, one would have to conclude that the court in that
case erred in suppressing Al-’Owhali’s statements to the FBI
pursuant to the modified Miranda warnings that he received. Al-
’Owhali’s statements were made voluntarily pursuant to the privilege
against self-incrimination,322 thus the only ground for exclusion in that
case was the Miranda doctrine. The FBI agents in Bin Laden advised
Al-’Owhali that he had the right to remain silent.323 Regarding the
right to counsel, however, it is at best unclear whether Al-’Owhali
had such a right during the interrogation—reported Kenyan law is
murky on that issue, as the Bin Laden court discovered.324 The FBI
agents in Kenya believed in good faith, after speaking with Kenyan
authorities, that counsel was available “at the sole discretion” of the
opposed to American—law enforcement. The Bin Laden court stated that these cases further
provide that “the lack of Miranda warnings will still lead to suppression if U.S. law enforcement
themselves actively participated in the questioning . . . or if U.S. personnel, despite asking no
questions directly, used the foreign officials as their interrogational agents in order to
circumvent the requirements of Miranda.” Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 187. This is not an
entirely accurate statement. First, in all of the cases but Emery, the American law enforcement
officers did not participate in the questioning. Thus, these cases simply held that because the
foreign police conducted the interrogation in question, Miranda was not implicated. Each of
these cases then mentioned in passing—without any analysis—that if the American
representatives had participated, then the outcome might have been different. These statements
constitute mere dicta, as none of the cases squarely addressed the issue or in fact ruled on
whether Miranda warnings are required when American law enforcement participates in the
questioning. The Emery case, however, did hold that because American law enforcement
officers actively participated in the questioning along with foreign law enforcement in that case,
a Miranda violation occurred. 591 F.2d at 1267–68. It is unclear, however, whether the
defendant in that case, John Emery, was a citizen of the United States or of Mexico (the site of
the interrogation). Thus, it is questionable whether Emery supports Bin Laden in holding that
Miranda warnings must be administered to non-Americans abroad. In addition, the Emery
decision made its ruling on this point without any significant analysis. Emery, 591 F.2d at 1268.
Thus, it can fairly be said that two cases, Dopf and Cranford, support some aspects of the
analysis proffered by this Article, while one case, Emery, perhaps supports some aspects of the
holding of Bin Laden. Neither Dopf nor Cranford nor Emery, however, should carry much
weight as their analyses were too superficial to support either perspective.
322. See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 194 n.26 (stating that “[even if the relevant standard
were due process, Al-‘Owhali’s confession would still be considered voluntary”).
323. Id. at 173 (“You do not have to speak to us or answer any questions. Even if you have
already spoken to the Kenyan authorities, you do not have to speak to us now.”). Whether he
actually enjoyed that right is unknown, as the Bin Laden court simply assumed that this warning
must always be administered.
324. Id. at 190–91. For more on the court’s treatment of Kenyan law, see supra notes 302–
303 and accompanying text.
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Kenyan investigators.325 They nevertheless advised him that because
the interrogation was taking place in Kenya and his right to counsel
during the interrogation could not be guaranteed, he still had a choice
whether he wished to speak to the American representatives without
a lawyer present.326
If Kenyan law did not provide Al-’Owhali with the right to
counsel during the interrogation, the FBI should have been able to
remain silent on the issue without risking suppression of the
statements by Al-’Owhali. The warnings they did provide Al-’Owhali
on that subject would have been superfluous. Because there was
nothing in the record of the Bin Laden court demonstrating that the
right to counsel during an interrogation in Kenya was an actual right,
no warnings pertaining to counsel should have been required in that
case. On the other hand, if Kenyan law did provide Al-’Owhali with
the right to counsel, Al-’Owhali’s statements should not have been
suppressed under the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.
The FBI agents were acting under considerable time pressure and
certainly could not have been expected to stop their investigation to
research the intricacies of Kenyan law. If they had done so, a clear
answer would not have been available in any event. They did,
however, inquire of the Kenyan authorities concerning the right to
counsel, and they had no reason not to doubt the accuracy of the
answer they received. As such, the FBI agents did not act negligently
or in bad faith, and the application of the exclusionary rule was
inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
Because of the unique nature of the privilege against self-
incrimination, the Miranda doctrine is one of the few—if not the
only—constitutional doctrines that can apply in some circumstances
to non-Americans outside the borders of the United States. Given the
drastic increase in American law enforcement abroad in recent years,
the international setting is likely to be the next frontier for the courts
to explore the boundaries of Miranda.
The recent Dickerson decision notwithstanding, a modification to
the Miranda doctrine is inevitable in the international context. Courts
325. Id. at 191 (internal quotations omitted).
326. Id. at 173–74 (“If you decide to speak with us now, without a lawyer present, you will
still have the right to stop answering questions at any time.”).
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will be called on to create a new framework that recognizes the
delicate balance between law enforcement and civil liberties, that
supports the core policies embodied in Miranda and its exceptions,
and that has the flexibility to work in the myriad situations that arise
in countries offering various protections to civil rights. The Bin Laden
court was the first court to undertake this challenging task, but the
framework it created accomplishes none of these objectives.
The four international Miranda warnings created by the Bin
Laden court, and the heavy additional burdens that the court placed
on American law enforcement abroad, do not protect—and in many
situations will actually undermine—the civil liberties that the court
was trying to protect. Indeed, one of the unintended results of the Bin
Laden court’s analysis is that FBI agents abroad will be forced,
because of the “freeze out” effect created by the court’s onerously
strict adherence to domestic Miranda requirements, to back out of
foreign interrogations and turn suspects over to the host country for
interrogation and prosecution. Because many countries around the
world do not protect civil liberties as vigilantly as the United States
does, this will often result in greater civil rights abuses than would
have occurred had the FBI agent retained control of the interrogation
and proceeded without administering Miranda warnings. And if this
same suspect who was interrogated by the foreign police were later
tried in the United States, Miranda warnings would not be required
under the “foreign police” exception to Miranda. Thus, a universal
application of the Bin Laden rule would unduly burden law
enforcement and may undermine civil liberties without offering
countervailing protections to civil liberties.
This Article contends that when the underlying rationales of
Miranda and its exclusionary rule are properly applied in the
international arena, American law enforcement officials should be
required to advise a suspect only of the rights that he actually enjoys
in the country in which the interrogation occurs. Given the
complexities of foreign law, the lessons of Quarles and Berkemer, and
the policies behind the exclusionary rule, if an FBI agent incorrectly
interprets the rights available under foreign law in crafting his
warnings, any confession that follows should not be suppressed if the
agent made a good faith effort under the circumstances to determine
what rights were available to the defendant.
